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I. TaE PROBLEm
the two extremes of freedom of trade, undisturbed by state
action on the one hand, and of a state monopoly of foreign trade on the
other, there is a wide variety of possible forms of state intervention into the
free play of international trade. The "classical" means of state intervention
is customs duties. Until the beginning of the twentieth century tariffs proved
to be at least generally sufficient to protect national economic interests which
might be opposed to the idea of free trade.1 The "successful" protective tariff
policy of the United States is a good example.
2
World War I marked a decisive change in international economic relations.

B ETWEEN

* LL.B., Dr. iur. (Cologne); Candidate for S.J.D. (Harvard) 1966; Research Assoc.,
Faculty of Law, Bonn University; Member, German Bar.
1. On the other hand, mercantilism developed beside tariffs a rich scale of means
for a centrally administered foreign-trade policy, which was hardly inferior to that used
after 1934. For illustration, reference may be made, e.g., to the Treaty Between Great

Britain and Portugal, December 27, 1703 (the Methuen Treaty), the main purpose of
which was to repeal the import prohibition against all British woolen manufactures. See
the text of the treaty in 2 Hertslet, A Complete Collection of Treaties and Conventions
at Present Subsisting Between Great Britain and Foreign Powers 24-25 (1820). Regarding
the earlier forms of state intervention into foreign trade relations, see 2 Heckscher, Der
Merkantilismus 159-71 (1932); Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations
28-31 (2d ed. 1950); Nussbaum, Money in the Law [hereinafter cited Money] 446-47
(2d ed. 1950).
2. As an example, the relevant legislative measures of Germany during World War I
and immediately afterwards may be cited: Gesetz betreffend Anderung des Miinzgesetzes,
Aug. 4, 1914, [1914] Reichsgesetzblatt [hereinafter cited RGBl] 326 (suspension of the
obligation of the Reichsbank to take in money and pay out gold); Bekanntmachung fiber
die Unverbindlichkeit gewisser Zahungsvereinbarungen, Sept. 28, 1914, [1914] RGBI 417
(suspension of the gold clause in certain types of contracts); Bekanntmachung iiber den

Handel mit ausliindischen Zahlungsmitteln, Jan. 20, 1916, [1916] RGBI 49 (central regulation of foreign exchange transactions); Bekanntmachung ilber die Regelung der Einfuhr,
Jan. 16, 1917, [1917] RGB1 41 (installation of a central control for importation);
Bekanntmachung iiber den Zahlungsverkehr mit dem Ausland (Devisenordnung), Feb. 8,
1917, [1917] RGBI 105 (new formulation of the foreign exchange law); Gesetz gegen die
Kapitalflucht, Sept. 8, 1919, [1919] RGBI 1540 (prohibition of direct export of any kind
of foreign currency); Verordnung ilber die Aussenhandelskontrolle, Dec. 20, 1919, [1919]
RGBI 2128 (introduction of export prohibitions and restrictions). Cf. Erler, Grundprobleme
des internationalen Wirtschaftstrechts 81-83 (1956).
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No doubt, after a period of strong state intervention caused by the war, the
idea of free trade seemed to prevail again in the years following 1920.1 But
after a few years of apparent consolidation of the economic situation, the
world-wide economic crisis of the early thirties led to a definitive departure
from the gold standard and to renewed strong state intervention into this area
of international relations. The countries, in their efforts to maintain a favorable
balance of trade, fell back upon a wide variety of means of intervention, which
ranged from import and export prohibitions and restrictions over antidumping
and countervailing duties to state monopolies and state trade. But those
measures confined to the trade area as such proved to be insufficient. Balance
of payment difficulties became more and more apparent, and beginning in 1931,
a steadily growing number of states subjected their foreign economic relations4
to a central and more or less strict regulation in the form of exchange control.
Exchange control, as Nussbaum defines it, "has come to include government control with respect to any financial intercourse with foreign countries
whatever the currency. " 5 The term exchange control, understood this way, is
a very comprehensive one. It has to be clearly distinguished from the much
narrower notion of exchange restrictions, because, as Fawcett points out, "all
exchange restrictions are a form of control; but not all exchange control is
restrictive of international payments .... 16 It is obvious that in the context of
this paper, exchange control is of interest only as long as it has some restrictive
effect. If the control is exercised only for statistical or other supervisory purposes, there is no conceivable danger for international trade. So it certainly
would be more correct to speak only of exchange restrictions in these pages.
If it is not done and if the terms exchange control and exchange restrictions
are used interchangeably for the purpose of this paper, the reason for it is 'not
so much the fact that it is done almost everywhere,7 but that because of this
common negligence the expression exchange control has by now gained a
3. Not only the Fourteen Points Program of President Wilson (point 3) but also
the Covenant of the League of Nations (art. 23(e)) incorporated the idea of free trade.
At a series of international monetary and economic conferences (e.g., Brussels 1920,
Geneva 1922, Geneva 1927, London 1933), great efforts were made under the guidance of
the League to cut down restrictions imposed on international trade. About the wide-ranging
activities of the League to reorganize sound international economic relations after World
War I, see Hill, The Economic and Financial Organization of the League of Nations (1946).
4. Schneider, Der Welthandel im Clearingsverkehr 228-29 (1937), counts 170 clearing
agreements between 41 countries. The International Chamber of Commerce figured for
March 1, 1939, a total number of 178 clearing and payments agreements in force between
38 countries. Cf. I International Chamber of Commerce, World Business Information
Center, Clearing and Payments Agreements (1938, loose-leaf service). These figures show
how widespread exchange control became in the late 1930's.
5. Nussbaum, Money 446.
6. Fawcett, The International Monetary Fund and International Law, 40 Brit. Yb.
of Intl L. 32, 42 (1964); see also Mann, Money in Public International Law, 96 Recuell

des Cours de l'Academie de Droit International de ]a Haye [hereinafter cited Recucil]
I., at 64 (1959).

7. As Fawcett, supra note 6, at 42, emphasizes correctly; cf., e.g., 2 O'Connell, International Law 1100-01 (1965).
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restrictive meaning if its own if the contrary is not expressly stated 8
Exchange control can be partial or total, i.e., it can cover only specific types
of money transactions or control the whole range of possible transfers of money,
no matter if these transfers are payments due in connection with foreign trade,
with services or other current business or if these payments are for the purpose of transferring capital. According to the terminology of the Agreement
of the International Monetary Fund,9 the most usual distinction today is
the distinction between payments for current transactions and payments
for the purpose of transferring capital, or, in short, between current and
capital transactions. In accepting this distinction, the following pages are
concerned only with current transactions, and with these transactions only
insofar as they are directly related to the international exchange of goods.
Out of this limitation it follows that exchange control, too, will be dealt with
only insofar as itcovers this type of transaction. The reason for the above
developed limitation lies in the purpose of this article. That purpose is to
demonstrate the effects of exchange control on international trade and to
answer the question whether these effects are leading to a discrimination which
can be called contrary to international law or, in other words, whether there
are any limitations under international law on the state's freedom of action
inthis area.
8. For a discussion of the expressions "exchange control" and "exchange restrictions"
and their meaning, see International Monetary Fund, First Annual Report on Exchange
Control 3-16 (1950); Kiing, Zur Theorie und Technik der Devisenzwangswirtschajt, 8
Finanzarchiv 567-70 (1941); Mann, Recueil 52-62; Nussbaum, Money 449-51. An
example of a definition of "exchange restrictions" in an international instrument itself can
be found in Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation With Germany, Oct. 29,
1954, art. 12 (5), 7 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1839, at 1853-54, 273 U.N.T.S. 3, at 20, [1956]
Bundesgesetzblatt [hereinafter cited BGB1] II. 487-94 T.IA.S. No. 3593. Art. 12 (5) is
formulated as follows:
The term "exchange restrictions" as used in the present Article includes all
restrictions, regulations, charges, taxes, fees and other requirements imposed by
either Party, which burden or interfere with the assumption of undertakings for,
or the making of, payment, remittances, or transfers of moneys and financial instruments.
For a critical discussion of this definition, see Mann, Recuell 53-55.
9. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 60 Stat. 1401, [19521
BGBI II. 638, 2 U.N.T.S. 40, T.I.A.S. No. 1501. Art. XIX(i) of the agreement reads as
follows:
(i)Payments for current transactions means payments which are not for
the purpose of transferring capital, and include without limitation:
(1) All payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current business, including services, and normal short-term banking and credit facilities;
(2) Payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other investments;
(3) Payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for depreciation of direct investments;
(4) Moderate remittances for family living expenses.
The Fund may, after consultation with the members concerned, determine
whether certain specific transactions are to be considered current transactions or
capital transactions.
The term "capital transaction" is not defined in the agreement. In any case, capital
transactions fall outside the scope of the agreement; see id. art. I(iv).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF NONDISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The unqualified notion of discrimination is a very popular term in the
language of modern economists describing the effects of exchange control on
international trade. The very concept of free trade is based on the idea of
an international division of labor, of a multilateral exchange of goods and of
the protection of world-wide competition without discrimination. According
to this theory, the only legitimate occasion for state intervention into the free
play of supply and demand is when the preservation of the international competitive position of the national economy is at stake. The only legitimate way
of doing this is by raising the tariff barriers. But even in this case, at least
until World War I, the most-favored-nation standard, inserted into a wide
network of commercial treaties, granted protection against a treatment discriminating against the economic potential of one or the other of the trading
partners. Behind the introduction of exchange control, one will very often find,
on the contrary, a conception of trade policy which tries to replace international
division of labor with national autarchy, and the multilateral protection of
equality of competition with a system of strictly bilateral preferences.10 But
even if this is not the case, exchange control leads almost necessarily to a discrimination against certain trading partners in favor of certain others.11 The
reason is that it is, as practice has proved, impossible to avoid a certain amount
of discriminatory treatment in the process of allotment of exchange quotas or
the manipulation of exchange rates. As Kindleberger has very convincingly
shown, by exchange control "a purchaser is required to buy at a price dearer
than another cheaper price, or a seller is required to sell at a price cheaper
than another dearer price, or a seller is not allowed to sell or a buyer to buy
at any price at all."' 2 In -all these cases exchange control falsifies the play of
supply and demand and in this way renders impossible the formation of a fair
market price. This is the reason why the liberal school of economic theory
speaks of exchange control as "the classical instrument of a trade policy which
is collective and not in conformity with the conception of a free-market economy" and having "necessarily arbitrary and discriminatory effects."' 18
Are these "necessarily arbitrary and discriminatory effects" of exchange
control with the same necessity contrary to international law? That would be
the case if there was a general rule of customary international law forbidding
10. Concerning these conceptions and their possible abuse, especially by a totalitarian system, see Child, The Theory and Practice of Exchange Control in Germany 133-49
(1958) ; Ellis, Exchange Control in Central Europe (1941).
11. Cf. Viner, in League of Nations Economic, Financial and Transit Dep't, Trade
Regulations Between Free-Market and Controlled Economies 9-13, 35-39 (L.N. Pub. No.
1943.1IA.4.).
12. Kindleberger, International Economics 81 (3d ed. 1963).
13. Rbpke, Internationale Ordnung-'eute 295 (2d ed. 1954); cf. also, e.g., Ellis,
Exchange Control and Discrimination, 37 Am. Econ. Rev. 877-88 (1947); Meade, The
Balance of Payments 386 (1951); Meyer, Devisenbewirtschaftung, in 2 Handwarterbuch
der Sozialwissenschaften 584-88 (1959).
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all kinds of discrimination. One of the consequences of the existence of such
a general rule would be that there would always be a violation of international
law once the existence of discrimination in economic terms was established. If
that were the case, the discriminatory effects of exchange control on international trade would not pose any greater legal problem.
But there is no general rule of international customary law outlawing discrimination so that states have to treat each other and each other's nationals
equally under any circumstances. So far, common agreement exists. 14 That does
not mean that there might not be in some specific areas-e.g., in the field of the
international protection of human rights-a limited obligation upon the state
to give equal treatment, an obligation widely recognized today. 15 But important
to the question under discussion here is only whether the states in their
economic relations have a legal duty to accord equal treatment to each other.
0 6
Such an obligation is nonexistent.
The fact alone that today one still finds in all bilateral and multilateral
treaties concerned with economic matters an explicit clause embodying an obligation of equal treatment or nondiscrimination and defining the scope of application
of this obligation, may be a sufficient verification of the accuracy of the existing
14. Cf. Jaenicke, Der Begriff der Diskriminierung im modernen V6lkerrecht [hereinafter
cited Diskriminierung] 139 (1940); Jaenicke, Diskriminierung und Gleichbehandlung, in
1 Strupp-Schlochauer, Wiirterbuch des V6lkerrechts 391-92, 691 (1960); Kipp, Das Verbot
der Diskritninierungim modernen Friedensvdlkerrecht, 9 Archiv des Vblkerrechts 137, 143
(1961-62); cf. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations 35-36 (1952).
15. How uncertain the scope of the obligation to grant nondiscriminatory treatment
is even in the area of human rights is demonstrated by the very long efforts of the United
Nations to formulate a concrete and binding prohibition of discrimination based on race,
sex, language or religion. Although the UN Charter (art. 1(3)) and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (art. 2) address themselves to nondiscrimination, the General Assembly has not only passed a Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Res. No. 1904 (XVIII), Nov. 20, 1963, U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 18th Sess.,
Supp. No. 14 at 35-37) but also a comprehensive International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which is subject to ratification by member states
(see the text of this draft convention in resolution No. 2106(XX), Dec. 21, 1965, U.N. Gen.
Ass. Off. Rec. 20th Sess. Supp. No. 14, at 47-51.
16. See authorities cited supra note 15; cf. Dahm, 2 V6lkerrecht 609 (1961) ; Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law 261 (1964); Hazard, Commercial
Discrimination and International Law, 52 Am. J. Int'l L. 495-98 (1958), who rebuts the
thesis put forward by communist international lawyers that a general obligation to nondiscrimination in international economic relations follows de lege lata directly from the
principle of "sovereign equality of states" and from the "respect for the principle of
equal rights" called for in art. 1(2) and art. 55 of the UN Charter. Against this idea see
Jaenicke, Diskriminierung 139-62; Metzger, Exchange Controls and International Law,
315 U. Ill. L.F. 311, 312-13 (1959).
Regarding the difference between a general prohibition of discrimination and the
notion of "abus de droit" which might be of importance also in the area of international
economic relations see text infra at 387-88. At this moment reference should be made only to
the fact that generally a discrimination is called contrary to international law only if
it is "odious, unfair, inspired by ']a malveillance b. l'6gard des 6trangers,' unjust, arbitrary,
in short abusive," as Mann, Recueil 93 points out. This shows that in all these cases the
discrimination called contrary to international law seems to be nothing else than another
name for "abus de droit," the facts have to be in both cases the same. For examples with
references, see Mann, Recueil 90, 95-98; cf. 1 Hyde, International Law 677 (2d ed. 1947).
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opinion. The finding is true for the area of international exchange of goods
as well as for the field of international money transactions. Reference may be
made to art. 1(1) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade17 and to
art. 8(3) of the Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.
It follows from the lack of a general duty of nondiscrimination recognized
by international law that one can speak of discrimination violating international
law' 8 only in the case where there is both discriminatory treatment as such
and also proof of an international legal duty to equal treatment which has
been violated. As long as the latter is not proved, discrimination in the economic
sense may be as obvious as it can be, and yet it cannot be regarded as a violation of international law.

III. DELIMITATION OF THE Topic
As the foregoing considerations have shown, in order to evaluate from
a legal point of view the discriminatory effects of exchange control it is necessary
to demonstrate the concrete limitations upon the decision-making power of
states in this area. This demonstration is the real purpose of the following
pages. They will cover the rise of exchange control as an instrument for the
regulation of foreign trade in the period between the two wars and the subsequent attempts to limit the negative results of this control by international
law. In this connection, the examples of the attitudes of Germany and the
United States toward exchange control will play a major role. Both countries
have in a rather different way made remarkable contributions to the development of rules of international law limiting the states' freedom of action in
this particular area. Germany after 1934 is a good example of a system of
exchange control carried to its extremes. The United States, on the contrary,
after 1934 was the most important trading nation fighting with determination
for the restoration of multilateral and nondiscriminatory international trade.
The scope of the inquiry will be limited to corresponding efforts on the
level of international law prior to the establishment of GATT and IMF. The
development after 1945 has to be reserved for a later discussion.
17. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A12, [19511 DGBI
II. Annex I, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 196-98, T.IA.S. No. 1700.
.18. There is a problem of terminology. Jaenicke, Diskriminierung 14, is of the opinion
that the practice of international law uses the term discrimination to characterize "elne
vblkerrechtswidrige unterschiedliche Behandlung," a different treatment as such contrary to
international law. This understanding of "discrimination" is not in conformity with the
practice of international law. In the terminology of international treaties and other relevant
documents, discrimination does not mean anything other than "different treatment." The
discrimination becomes contrary to international law, only if it is expressly declared to be
prohibited by the treaty or the document in question. Jaenicke himself comes to the same
result and so contradicts his own terminology. Against this terminology, see also Elsternd,
Das Verbot der linderweisen Diskriminierung im Welthandelsrecht 11-12 (1958); Kipp, Das
Verbot der Diskriminierung im modernen Friedensv61kerrecht, 9 Archiv des Vblkerrecbts
137-38 (1961-62).
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IV. THE ExAmPLE OF THE GERMAN EXCHANGE CONTROL SYSTEM
AND ITS EFFECTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN TRADE RELATIONS
AFTER 1934

It is not the purpose of this article to demonstrate and explain the
different possible systems of exchange control. There is a great deal of writing
by economists on this specific topic. 19 The different methods of exchange
control practiced by different countries have also been the object of detailed
and learned analyses. 20 For the purpose of judging the effects of exchange control as to conformity with international law, it is not necessary to enter into the
details of its internal mechanism. It is enough to ascertain-as has been donethat according to practical experience exchange control leads almost necessarily to discriminatory treatment in international trade relations. But there
is always an advantage in having a concrete example as a basis for legal argument. That is the reason for a short glance at the system of exchange control
practiced by Germany before World War II.
In the first phase of exchange control between August 1931 and the
spring of 1934, the German government tried to limit the effects of this
control to the transfer of capital and to leave unhampered the freedom of
foreign tradesl But the measures taken in this period in the long run proved
19. For a short but very clear and comprehensive survey of the different possible
forms of exchange restrictions, see International Monetary Fund, First Annual Report on
Exchange Restrictions 3-16 (1950). The main distinction which can be made is the one between quantitative and cost restrictions. To apply quantitative restrictions means to determine the amount of exchange made available by the government concerned in quantitative
terms. This is done, for example, by fixing an overall global quota of foreign exchange which
is available for a certain period without making any distinction between different foreign
currencies, by establishing separate quotas for different currencies, or by individual allocation
of exchange in the form of a licensing system. Examples of cost restrictions are the many
different multiple currency practices which, by increasing the cost for certain types of exchange transactions, reduce the demand for foreign exchange. Another method combining the
two approaches is the so-called auction system. Under this system the administration sells
the amount of foreign exchange which it makes available to the highest bidders.
Practical examples for all these and many other methods of exchange control can be
found in the survey of the different restrictive systems existing in the member countries of
the International Monetary Fund. See the First Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions
supra at 49-135, and the corresponding sections in all the following Annual Reports, the last
being the 17th (1966). For further general discussion, cf. Bachmann, Die Kontrolle des
internationalenZahlungsverkehrs, 9 Aussenwirtschaft 171 (1954); Einzig, Exchange Control
passim (1934); Liebrich, Elemente des Devisenrechts 100-06 (1955); Luckas, Theorie der
Devisenzwangswirtschaft auf Grund der deutschen und auslindischen Erfahrungen in der
Zeit von 1914-1940, at 16-40 (1940); Meyer, Devisenbezoirtschaftung als neue Wiihrungsreform, 49 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 415 (1939); Meyer, Devisenbewirtschaftung, 2 Handwirterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften 584; Rittershausen, Internationale Handels und Devisenpoitik 165-75 (2d ed. 1955); R6pke, Devisenzwangsvirtschaft: das Kardinaiproblem der
internationalenWirtschaft, 5 Aussenwirtschaft 21 (1950) ; Viner, op. cit. supra note 11, at 9.
20. See authorities cited, supra note 10; cf. Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money [hereinafter cited Legal Aspect] 337-53 (2d ed. 1953) ; MUller, Grundriss der Devisenbewirtschaftung
(2d ed. 1939); Piatier, Le Controle des Devises dans l'Economie du IIIe Reich (1937);
Salem, Exchange Control and the Argentine Market (1941); U.S. Tariff Comm'n, Foreign
Trade and Exchange Controls in Germany (Report No. 150, 2d ser., 1942).
21. Regarding this early phase of exchange control and the practice of the so-called
Allgemeinen Genehmigungen, see Child, op. cit. supra note.10, at 30-38; Erler, op. cit. supra
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to be insufficient to secure the necessary balance of payments. After the
assumption of power by the National Socialists, the forced revival of the
German economy led to a strong rise in the demand for imports. The immediate consequence was to turn the existing positive balance of trade into
a negative balance.2 2 As soon as this happened, the distinction made up to
this time between monetary and trade policy no longer seemed to be justifiable.
After first submitting only the importation of agricultural products, raw
materials and semi-manufactured goods 28 to central control, the so-called "New
Plan" of the President of the Reichsbank Schacht led to a final fusion of
monetary and trade policy into a new conception of foreign economic policy,
the main purpose of which was to secure under any circumstances a favorable
balance of payments. The basic idea of the "New Plan" was that Germany
should import only as much as it was able to pay for by its exports. To achieve
this result, imports were allowed only from those countries in which there
existed buyers of German exports of at least the same volume. Until an increase of the export capacity was possible, the importation of so-called es24
sential goods had absolute priority over the import of so-called luxury goods.
On the import side, the "New Plan" was put into effect by a strict customs
clearance provision covering every import.25 A customs clearance of imported
goods could take place only after a foreign exchange certificate was produced as
evidence that a sufficient amount of foreign currency had been provided by the
central governmental agency in charge of the administration of all exchange
control matters. The corresponding measure on the export side was a comprehensive obligation of all exporters to "offer"128 all claims against foreigners
to the administration so that it could buy them, no matter whether these claims
were in foreign or domestic currency. These exchange control measures were
note 2, at 90; Mifler, op. cit. supra note 20, at 257-60; U.S. Tariff Comm'n, op. cit. supra
note 20, at 64-69.
22. There was an export surplus of 667 million Reichsmark in 1933 against a surplus

of imports of 285 million Reichsmark in 1934; see U.S. Tariff Comm'n, op. cit. supra note
20, at 53-54.
23. There was, e.g., the Reichsmaisstelle, founded by law of March 26, 1930, [1930]
RGBI I. 88, the competence of which to control the importation of agricultural products
was steadily enlarged, or another Reichssteile charged with the control over importation of
industrial raw materials and semi-manufactured goods, instituted by law of March 24, 1934,
[1934] RGBI I. 212. Later a total number of twenty-nine similar institutions were brought
to life; cf. Schulz, 1 Aussenwirtschaftstrecht 5 (1965).
24. About the importance of the "New Plan" cf. Child, op. cit. supra note 10, at 133-45;

Miller, op. cit. supra note 21, at 261-70; U.S. Tariff Comm'n, op. cit. supra note 20, at
113-17.
25. See para. 9 of the executory decree to the Gesetz iUber die Devisenbewirtschaftung,
Dec. 23, 1938, [1938] RGB1 I. 1966, 1967. About the extent of this customs clearing prohibition, see Gurski-Schulz, Devisengesetz 270-71 (1939); Miller, op. cit. supra note 20, at 263.
26. The so-called Anbietungspflicht, which in practice was nothing more than the
obligation to sell these claims to the administration against payment in Reichmarks, was the
most efficient way to exclude the uncontrolled out-flow of foreign currency. This obligation
was introduced by a decree of July 15, 1931, [1931] RGB1 I. 366, and found its final
formulation in para. 46 of the Gesetz iiber Devisenbewirtschaftung, Dec. 12, 1938, [1938]
RGB1 I. 1733, 1740-41; cf. Gurski-Schulz, op. cit. supra note 25, at 132-49; Mfiller, op. cit.
supra note 20, at 123-24.
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supplemented by a comprehensive system of direct quantitative restrictions on
imports and exports. 27 The centralized control of importation and exportation
as a whole, refined over the years by a variety of further state interventionse.g., in the form of direct or indirect export subsidies, or by manipulating the
rate of exchange of the Reichsmark 2 8 -made Germany the example of a trading
partner with at least a de facto state monopoly on foreign trade.
This centralized state control of foreign trade led necessarily to a radical
change in the treaty relationships between Germany and its trading partners.
The network of long-term commercial treaties, existing at the time of the rise
of exchange control, the particular advantages and disadvantages of which
were very much assimilated through the mechanism of the most-favored-nation
clause, was superseded by a large number of flexible and strictly bilateral shortterm trade agreements. 2 9 The multilateral system of payments was replaced by
a large number of payments and clearing agreements. 30 The maxim "buy from
your client," which was one of the basic principles of the "New Plan," caused
a shift in the trade relations of Germany to favor those trading partners which,
according to experience, had a passive balance of trade with Germany or were
irreplaceable commodity suppliers for the German industry.
Out of this very short survey of the measures taken by Germany after
1934, the discriminatory effects of exchange control on its trade relations
become apparent. Germany discriminated not only in favor of available currencies and against scarce currencies (for example, in favor of Southeast European currencies and against the dollar) 3 ' and made a distinction not only
27. The starting point of this development was the Verordnung iider die Aussenhandelskontrolle, Dec. 20, 1919, [1919] RGBI 2128, a reminder of the time immediately following
the war. The final stage of the same development was the Gesetz ilber Einfuhr-und
Ausfuhrverbote, March 25, 1939, [1939] RGBI I. 578.
28. Concerning the practices of the so-called Aushinder-Sonderkonten filr Inlandzahlungen (ASKI), of the maintenance of an artificially high rate of exchange for the Reichsmark, of additional export-compensations and other indirect export subsidies, see Child,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 33-38; Mfiller, op. cit. supra note 20, at 290-302; Nussbaum, Money
451-54; U.S. Tariff Comm'n, op. cit. supra note 20, at 85-92.
29. As an example of the steady change of German foreign-trade relations based on an
inextricable welter of mostly short-term trade agreements, the corresponding catalogs in
[1934] RGBl II. Index 67-68, and [1935] RGBI II. Index 88-89, may be cited.
30. About the distinction between payments and clearing agreements cf. Hug, The Law
of InternationalPayments, 79 Recueil des Cours II. 540-47 (1951); Lemkin, La R6glementation des Paiements Internationaux 201-40 (1939); Nussbaum, Money 515-23; Wabnitz, Der
zwischenstaatliche Zahlungsverkehr auf der Grundlage internationaler Zahlungsabkommen
10-15 (1955).
31. A comparison of German imports in the years 1929 and 1938 with East European
countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithunia, Romania,
Turkey) on the one hand and with the United States on the other, shows the following
changes (in million Reichmark):
1929
. 763 = 5.7% of all German imports
Eastern Europe
1,790.4 = 13.3% of all German imports
USA
1938
747 = 13.6% of all German imports
Eastern Europe
404.6 = 7.4% of all German imports
USA
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between essential and luxury goods (for example, in favor of certain raw materials and against manufactured goods),32 but discriminated also in favor of
certain necessary goods produced in certain countries and against the same
goods produced in other countries8 3 So the market price as the decisive element
for the direction of importation and exportation lost its importance in the
over-all effort to bring about a balance of payments.
The discriminatory effects of the system of exchange control practices by
Germany being evident, the main question poses itself very clearly: Did
Germany violate limitations imposed upon it by international law in introducing
or handling the demonstrated system of exchange control? Limitations imposed
by international law are conceivable on two different levels. On the one hand
it is possible that the state's sovereignty over its currency as such is subject
to certain restrictions limiting directly its freedom of action in this area. On
the other hand, it is conceivable that the state's monetary sovereignty is
limited indirectly, at least insofar as its decisions have effects upon another
Beside a general decline of importation in absolute figures-one of the necessary consequences of exchange control, especially if connected with a strong tendency toward autarchy
-the exceptionally heavy decline of imports from the United States cannot be overlooked.
In absolute figures the recission is about 75%, but also in relative terms it is still about 50%.
(Data according to U.S. Tariff Comm'n, op. cit. supra note 20, at 176-77.)
32. A comparison of the years 1929 and 1938 as to the importation of raw materials
and manufactured goods shows the following picture (in million Reicbmark):
Raw Materials
= 29.2% of all German imports
2.927
1929
= 34.8% of all German imports
1.900
1938
Manufactured Goods
= 13.1% of all German imports
1.765
1929
= 7.3% of all German imports
.397
1938
Here also, in absolute figures, a clear reduction of imports on the whole is seen. But relatively,
the quota of raw materials in the total importation went up about 15% whereas in the
same period the quota of manufactured goods dropped about 50%. (Data according to the
U.S. Tariff Comm'n, op. cit. supra note 20, at 122; Child, op. cit. supra note 10, at 222.)
The distinction made between essential and luxury goods and the different treatment
following this distinction certainly represents a discrimination in economic terms because
the competitive position of these goods on the market of the country which makes the distinction is necessarily going to change. As Patterson, Discrimination in International Trade
20 (1966), points out, in economic terms "any import restriction, other perhaps than a uniform ad valorem duty on all products from all sources, involves dicrimination." Not so in
legal terms. The legal concept of discrimination, in the practice of trade agreements, presupposes that there is a different treatment of the same or at least similar goods of different
"national" origin. It is concerned not only exclusively with discrimination as among nations
and not as among commodities but also exclusively with the comparison of the same or
similar goods and not with the volume of export of different countries on the whole. So a
distinction between essential and luxury goods in the administration of exchange control
as such seems to be as unobjectionable in legal terms as different tariffs on, for example,
meat and coffee even if there is a most-favored-nation clause covering both. The question
of whether there is "unlawful" discrimination arises only if coffee coming from different
countries is treated differently by the customs or exchange control administration.
33. The quota of the United States in, e.g., the German importation of raw tobacco
dropped from 5.7% in 1929 to 2.3% in 1939 whereas Turkey's share in the same period
rose from 12.5% to 15.2%, Greece's share from 26.7% to 33%, and Bulgaria's share from
8.6% to 18.2%. The development in the area of German imports of lumber was similar:
USA, 1929, 10.8%, 1938, 3.5%; Yugoslavia, 1929, 2%, 1938, 7.5%; Finland, 1929, 11.5%,
1938, 16.7%. (Data according to U.S. Tariff Comm'n, op. cit. supra note 20, at 154, 251-84.)

EXCHANGE CONTROL
level of its activities, that is, the level of its foreign trade. At least on this level
there may be some principles of customary or contractual international law
rendering certain steps or measures unlawful.
V. LIMITATIONS BY INTERNATIONAL LAW UPON THE STATE'S
MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY

A. Limitations by Customary InternationalLaw
Even today monetary sovereignty is still regarded as one of the main
features of state sovereignty as a whole. 34 This characterization does not place

monetary sovereignty outside the scope and limits of international law.3 5 But
it does establish a prima facie case in favor of the state's freedom of action
in all questions involving currency, notwithstanding the far-reaching effects
of these decisions on international economic relations in general. This presumption can be rebutted only by the proof of a prohibitive rule of international
customary or treaty law.8 6
As has been suggested, a general prohibition by international law of
all forms of discrimination does not exist in the field of economic or monetary
policy. This assertion does not imply that the state's discretion is not limited
in the area in question by the notion of "abus de droit," 37 if one accepts this
notion as at least a "general principle of law" in the meaning of article 38(c)
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, having as such authority in
international law. 8 Which cases of discrimination this general notion of "abus
34. See the frequently cited dicta of the Permanent International Court of Justice
in the Serbian and Brazilian Loans Cases, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 20/21, at 41, 122, (1929);
see also, e.g., Bindschedler, Verstaatlichungsmassnahmen und Entschiidigungspfficht im
V61kerrecht 37-38 (1950); 2 Dahm, V6lkerrecht 608 (1961); 1 Huber, Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht 490 (2d ed. 1953); Mann, Legal Aspect 419; Mann, Recueil 75; Nolde,
La Monnaie en droit International Public, 27 Recueil des Cours II. 243, at 249 (1929);
Nussbaum, Money 546; 2 O'Connell, International Law 1098 (1965). It is not within the
scope of this article to enter into a discussion of the different existing legal theories of
money. The reader is referred to Aufricht, The Fund Agreement and the Legal Theory oj
Money, 10 Oesterreichische Zeitschrift fuer Oeffentliches Recht 26, 71-77 (1959). Against the
opinion of Aufricht it may be submitted that regardless of his affiliation with a certain
monetary theory, nobody today denies the very important role domestic law plays in relation
to money on the one hand and the great impact of international law on monetary sovereignty
on the other. At least in this connection the theoretical differences do not seem to be of too
great importance.
35. Cf. Juge Lauterpacht in his separate opinion in the Case of Certain Norwegian
Loans, [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 37.
36. "Restrictions upon the independence of states cannot be presumed." The S.S. Lotus,
P.C.Ij., ser. A, No. 10, at 18 (1927).
37. So expressly, 2 Dahm, V6lkerrecht 609 (1961); Mann, Legal Aspect 423; Mann,
Recueil 92; 2 O'Connell, International Law 1097 (1965).
38. In favor of the recognition of the principle of "abus de droit" as part of the
international law de lege lata, see the Case of Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District
of Gex, P.C.IJ., ser. A/B, No. 46, at 146 (1932); Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951]
I.C.J. Rep. 1426; cf. the separate opinions of Judge Alvarez, [1947-48] I.j.
Rep. 69, 71,
[1949] I.C.J. Rep. 47-48, [1950] I.CJ. Rep. 15, [1951] I.CJ. Rep. 149; Bing Cheng,
General Principles of Law 121-22 (1950); 1 Dahm, Vblkerrecht 194 (1958); Garcia Amador,
State Responsibility--Some New Problems, 94 Recueil des Cours II. 369, 376-82 (1958);
Guggenheim, La Validit6 et la Nullit6 des Actes Juridiques Internationaux, 74 Recueil des
Cours I. 195, 250-54 (1949); Lauterpacht, The Functions of Law in the International
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de droit" covers is nevertheless as unclear as the scope and meaning of this
prohibition. Only one thing is rather certain: "abus de droit" covers nothing
but very exceptional cases. Under what circumstances can one speak of such
an exceptional case? Is it mainly the subjective element of conscious and
aggressive arbitrariness or malevolence which makes a certain discrimination
fall under "abus de droit"39 or is it the objectively definable fact that a certain
right is exercised in an "anti-social" way, i.e., in a way contrary to its very
function°4 0 which identifies a certain discrimination as a case of "abus de droit"?
Furthermore, even if there is a clear enough standard for the legal determination of "abus de droit" in a given case, the problem remains that it is very
difficult to prove the facts necessary for a verdict under this rather vague
principle of international law. Finally, it always is open to the "delinquent"
to rely on the excuse of an economic emergency and to characterize the measure
taken as an act of self-help-an excuse which is very difficult to refute.4'
So on the whole, it seems to be rather obvious that "abus de droit" as a limitation of the state's monetary sovereignty will lead only in a very few extreme
cases to a verdict under international law; and this is as much due to the theoretical vagueness of the offense as to the practical difficulty of proving the necessary facts.
As far as exchange control is concerned, the conclusion from the foregoing is that the introduction of a system of exchange control as such can
hardly be regarded as "abus de droit" even if this introduction in the long
run leads always to discriminatory effects on foreign trade. 42 On the other
hand, the notion of "abus de droit" may become relevant as far as the handling
of exchange control by the controlling state is concerned. But even here, the
notion of "abus de droit" will only under exceptional circumstances prove
Community 286-306 (1933); Politis, Le Problime des Limitations de la Souverainetd el la
Thorie de l'Abus des Droits dans lesRapports Internationaux, 6 Recueil des Cours 5-121
(1925); Kiss, L'Abus de Droit en Droit International passi, (1953) (with exhaustive references). Critical or even negative treatments of the principle appear in, e.g., Ago, Le D61it
International, 68 Recueil des Cours II. 443 (1939); Roulet, Le Caract6re artificiel do ]a
Thorie de l'abus de Droit en Droit International Public 149-50 (1958); Schwarzenberger,
The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87 Recuell des Cours I. 305 (1955); 1
Sereni, Diritto Internazionae 118 (1956).
39. The subjective element is emphasized by those who stress the close relationship
between "abus de droit" and "bona fides" or take them even as identical. See, e.g., Laun,
Bemerkungenzum freien Ermessen und zum detournement de pouvoir iinstaatlichen und
VdIkerrecht, in Festschrift ffir H. Kraus 128, 148-55 (1954); Leibholz, Das Verbot der
Willkiir und des Ermessensmissbrauches im vdlkerrechtlichen Verkehr der Staaten, 1 Zeitschrift ffir ausilindisches bffentliches Recht und V6lkerrecht I. 77 (1929); Verdross,
V6lkerrecht 131-32 (5th ed. 1964).

40. Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 38, at 286; Mann, Recudl 92; Garcia Amador,

supra note 38, at 381-82.
41. See Nussbaum, Money 476.
42. Hug, The Law of International Payments, 79 Recuel des Cours II. 511, at 591-92
(1951); Mann, Recueil 67; Nussbaum, Money 475; see also United States Int'l Claims
Comm'n, Tabar Claim (No. 3), 20 International Law Reports 242 (1953). An exception
may be the case in which the introduction of exchange control is not at all motivated by

an economic emergency but only chosen as a powerful weapon in international economic
warfare, as "an instrument of oppression and discrimination" right from the very beginning;
see Mann, Recueil 97-98, and 2 O'Connell, International Law 1098 (1965).
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the inadmissibility of certain exchange control measures under international
43
law.
Besides this barrier of "abus de droit" which apparently is not too effective,
there are no other limitations in general, international law on the state's freedom
of decision and action in the field of monetary policy. Remaining is the possibility of contractual limitations. So, returning to the example of Germany,
the further question to ask is: Did Germany, by introducing and handling
a system of exchange control, violate its existing treaty obligations?
B. Limitations by International Treaty Obligations

In the process of examining Germany's contractual obligations under
the commercial treaties concluded before World War I or in the period between
1920 and 1932, one will find no reference to the existence or the possible implications of exchange control. The regulation of the flow of goods to and
from foreign countries was exercised by way of tariffs and-during and immediately following the war-by a more or less strict system of quantitative
import and export controls. To go beyond this in the regulation of exports
and imports was far outside the usual practice. 44 So it becomes understandable
that one does not find any express reference to exchange control in the existing
commercial treaties and no attempt to exclude or limit the negative effects of
such a control on international trade. When, after 1933, exchange control
proved to be one of the most effective methods for the regulation of foreign
trade, the question arose whether the general precautions taken against discriminatory treatment in the usual form would also grant protection against
this new and indirect way of interfering with foreign trade. The "classical"
contractual precautions against discriminatory treatment by the trading partner
43. As an example of such a measure, the application of certain partly secret exchange
control decrees upon the Jewish population in Germany after 1933 may be cited. The Jewish
people on the one hand were forced to leave the country, and on the other hand their
assets were confiscated because they were regarded as Republikfluchtlinge (republic fugitives).
See, e.g., the following German cases: judgment of OLG K61n, [1953] Rechtsprechung zur
Wiedergutmachung [hereinafter cited RzW] 323; Judgment of OLG Karlsruhe, [1954] RzW
348; Judgment of ORG Berlin, [1955] RzW 327; Judgment of BGH, [19561 RzW 118;
judgment of BGH, [1962] RzW 118; Mann, Recueil '96, cites similar decisions. In these
cases the degree of discrimination was so high and obvious that Germany's action has to be
regarded as an international wrong, although most of the Jews at the time of the taking of
property still had German nationality.
44. It seemed possible only in time of war. As a general experience, international trade
declines in time of war so that this practice, even if adopted, did not have any great importance. For the German and British practice during and after World War I, see Erler,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 82-83; Mann, Legal Aspect 338.
One of the earliest examples in non-German treaty practice which mentions exchange
control is the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between Great Britain and Greece,
July 16, 1926, art. 11, Cmnd. No. 2790 (1927), 27 Martens N.R.G. (3e sr.) 594, 598 (cited
by Mann, Recueil 71). In this treaty the Greek government granted most-favored-nation
treatment in the allotment of foreign currency to all British imports in case the Greek
government had to introduce exchange control. The exceptional economic and financial
background of this provision in Greece is discussed by Hill, The League of Nations and the
Work of Refugee Settlement and FinancialReconstruction in Greece, 34 Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv I. 265 (1931).
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are the most-favored-nation and the national treatment clauses.45 Both standards
promise equal treatment to the country favored by these clauses, i.e., normally
equal treatment for its nationals and its goods. In the first case, the point of
comparison is the best-treated third trading partner of the granting state.
In the second, it is the treatment given by the granting state to its own nationals and goods.
Already these two different reference points make it quite clear that the
standard of national treatment, no matter what its scope and area of application,
cannot constitute a workable remedy against the discriminatory consequences of
exchange control. A system of exchange control applies to everybody residing
inside the borders of the imposing state,40 whether these residents are its
nationals or not. That means, as Nussbaum points out, that exchange control
in fact strikes even more heavily against the nationals of the imposing state
than against foreigners.47 This should be enough to show the inaptness of the
45. The third "classical" but far less usual precaution against discriminatory treatment
is the so-called principle of the open door. By this standard the European powers in the
nineteenth century granted each other under exceptional circumstances an absolute reciprocal
equality of chances in the economic development of their colonial possessions. It may be
referred, e.g., to the Congo Act, signed in Berlin, Feb. 26, 1885, arts. 1 and 3, 10 Martens
N.R.G. (2e s6r.) 417-18; and to the preamble of the Act of Algeciras, April 7, 1906, 34
Martens N.R.G. (2e s~r.) 239. The "Jibert6 &onomique sans aucune indgalitV" of the Act
of Algeciras played a decisive role in the decision of the International Court of Justice in
the Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco,
[19521 I.C.J. Rep. 176. The insofar unanimous court considered the total prohibition of a
certain type of imports (imports not requiring an official allocation of exchange, or so-called
"imports sans devises," cf. 1 Pleadings 15-17) with only one exception in favor of French
goods as a discrimination contrary to existing treaty obligations. France made an effort to
justify the prohibition of these imports in the way it was framed as a basic part of a system
of exchange control existing at the time in Morocco (cf. 1 Pleadings 81-85, and 2 Pleadings
150). The court rejected the French argument:
The Government of France has submitted various contentions purporting to
demonstrate the legality of exchange control. The Court does not consider it necessary to pronounce these contentions. Even assuming the legality of exchange control,
the fact nevertheless remains that the measures applied by virtue of the Decree of
December 30th, 1948, have involved a discrimination in favor of imports from
France and other parts of the French union. This discrimination cannot be justified
by considerations relating to exchange control.
[1952] I.C.J. Rep. 186. This rather short passage (for a critique see, e.g., Laubad6re, Le
Statut International du Maroc et l'Arr9t de la Cour Internationale de Justice du 27 Aoat
1952, 6 Revue juridique et politique de 1Union Francaise 460-504 (1952)); Mann, Recueil
56-62 does not say very much about the only question which is of interest in this connection, namely, whether a system of exchange control with obvious discriminatory effects
on foreign trade is compatible with a treaty obligation granting equal treatment in a very
general language. In the first place, the measure applied by France was not an exchange
control measure as such, but a direct quantitative restriction of importations, no matter
how closely this quantitative restriction may have been incorporated in the system of exchange control. Moreover, the decision does not speak about the admissibility of this kind
of restriction in general but only about the inadmissibility of an exception to this restriction
in favor of a single country.
"46. See, e.g., para. 5(1) of the German Gesetz iUber der Devisenbewirtschaftung, Dee.
12, 1938, [1938] RGBI I. 1733-35. According to para. 5(1) a "person considered to be
a resident in the Reichsmark area" is "every natural or juridical personality domiciled or
having his normal residence or seat in the inland." For further commentary see Milller,
op. cit. supra note 20, at 61-63.
47. Nussbaum, Money 475.
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standard of national treatment as a valuable means of opposing the discriminatory effects of exchange control.
The most-favored-nation standard remains as the only possible form of
reliable precaution. It first has to be asked if the standard is applicable at
all because of its point of reference. Mann is very doubtful about this.48 He
points out that exchange control generally does not differentiate between
nationals and foreigners but between residents and nonresidents of the currency
area. So, discrimination following the application of exchange control is not
based on the nationality of the prospective seller or buyer, but on his affiliation
with a certain currency area. Nationality is a completely irrelevant factor in
this connection.
The objections of Mann against the applicability of a most-favored-nation
clause in the case of discriminatory effects of exchange control are nevertheless
not convincing, at least as far as the area of international trade is concerned,
which alone is of relevance here. 49 If two trading partners grant each other
most-favored-nation treatment as far as the importation and exportation of
their goods is concerned, the meaning of this treaty obligation is to assure
equal treatment with all imports coming from the best treated third country.
If one takes it very narrowly, exchange control leads only to a discrimination
against a certain currency and in favor of another one or, on the level of foreign
trade, to a discrimination against goods the payment for which is due in a
certain currency and in favor of goods payable in another currency, no matter
what is the "national" origin of the goods in question. But in practice discrimination against a certain currency also amounts always to a discrimination against one, or, in the case of a wider currency area, several national territories and against all goods produced or manufactured in this territory. This
necessary consequence is the reason why it does not seem conceivable that a
state which is accused of a violation of a most-favored-nation clause because
of the discriminatory effects of its system of exchange control on its foreign
trade is able to defend itself successfully by pointing out that the discrimination against specific goods was not based on nationality but on currency considerations. 10 To demonstrate the problem with an example: If Germany in 1933
48. Mann, Recueil 70-71; cf. in the same sense, Metzger, Exchange Controls and
InternationalLaw, 1959 U. Ill. L.F. 315-18.
49. On the other hand it might well be that the argument of Mann, Recueil 70-74,
is valid as far as the so-called capital transactions are concerned.
50. The decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Case of
Oscar Chinn, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 63 (1934), to which Mann, Recueil 71, refers, is not
contradictory to this result. It is true that the court points out very dearly that the
relevant obligation to equal treatment is violated only in the case where discrimination
against certain individuals is "based upon nationality and involving different treatment
by reason of their nationality as between persons belonging to different national groups";
ser. A/B, No. 63, at 87. The most important distinction between the facts of the Oscar
Chinn case and the one here under consideration is that in the Chinn case it could not be
proved that Belgium discriminated against a British merchant because of his nationality.
This proof lacking, the court regarded the actual discrimination rather as a fatal consequence
of the fact that Chinn's firm was the economically weakest private enterprise beside the
state-controlled Unatra in the same field of business. So in this case the actual discrimina-
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by exchange control action had granted preferential treatment to the importation of Italian oranges to the disadvantage of the same imports from the
United States, only because Italian liras were available and American dollars
were not, could Germany have successfully argued that there is no violation
of the most-favored-nation clause in force between the United States and
Germany on the sole ground that it discriminated against the United States
only as a currency area and not as a national territory? The answer must be
negative, not only because the effect on American oranges in both cases is
exactly the same, but also because the reason behind the discrimination is
identical: They are discriminated against because they are products of the
United States, despite that the United States is considered here, not as a national
territory, but as a currency areaY 1
Quite independently from this problem, two other questions arise. The
first is whether the most-favored-nation clause as formulated until 1934
tion against a foreign national was understood more or less as an accident. The situation
is completely different in the case under discussion. Here, there is a deliberate and openly
directed discrimination against the goods of a special nationality, with the only difference
that this nationality is understood in terms of monetary law as membership in a certain
currency area.
51. It could be argued that the International Court of Justice came to the same
result in the Morocco Case, cited supra note 45. The discrimination in this case was in
reality not one in favor of goods of a certain-French--"nationality" but one in favor of
goods coming from "Ia zone franc," the French currency area. So the basis of the distinction made was not so much the nationality as the fact in what currency the payment
for them had to be made; see [19521 I.C.J. Rep. 183. The court did not pay any attention
to the possibility of this distinction as to the basis of the discrimination.
In this connection two other inconsistencies in Metzger's argument may be mentioned
and discussed briefly. On the one hand he is arguing that the most-favored-nation standard
applied to exchange control is of "extremely limited relevance"; 1959 U. Il. L.F. 315. On
the other hand he concedes that the most-favored-nation standard, formulated for the
specific purpose of applying to exchange control (for an example of the type of formulation
he talks about, see infra at 399), limits the freedom of action of the government introducing
exchange control to such an extent that "it could obviously be at cross-purposes with
the exchange control"; 1959 U. Ill. L.F. 316. These two statements seem to be rather
contradictory because the formula he takes as an example is nothing but a reformulation of
the most-favored-nation standard making explicit the special problems of this new area
of state intervention into the mechanism of international trade without changing the
meaning or the dimension of the clause in question. This comes out very clearly in a clause
which is also cited in the text of this paper (infra, p. 404), where the principle of "unconditional most-favored-nation treatment" is stated as such in the first paragraph whereas
in the second paragraph the meaning of this commitment is explained but certainly not
extended, and the explanation uses the formulation Metzger's argument is based upon.
A second weakness of Metzger's argument seems to be that according to his opinion
a country which committed itself to a most-favored-nation treatment also in the area
of exchange control is nevertheless free to introduce exchange restrictions only as far as
the currency of this particular trading partner is concerned, whereas once it has introduced
these restrictions against several or all trading partners (the one in question included) it
is obliged to a nondisciminatory treatment of all the foreign currencies available. If this
were correct there would be a rather easy way to get out of any most-favored-nation
obligation in the area of exchange control. The only thing a country with this type of
obligation had to do would be to limit its system of exchange control to the one or the
different currencies it is short of. Once this is done it could do whatever it wanted to
favor the extention of trade with countries the currencies of which are still available and
to dry up trade relations with countries having a scarce currency without ever coming to
conflict with its treaty obligations concerning the nondiscriminatory handling of exchange
control.
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really covered measures of monetary policy taken by the country which was
bound by the clause. The second is the question of the effectiveness of such a
clause, supposing that it also covers the area of monetary policy. Both questions will be answered later. But they arise only after a positive answer to the
basic question regarding the general applicability of the clause despite the
formal differences of the points of comparison-here nationality, there residence in or affiliation with a currency area.
The most-favored-nation standard is not a general obligation to equal
treatment in the form of a treaty obligation. The limitation of the scope of its
application is first a result of the character and purpose of the treaty embodying
the clause, the treaty being, for example, one concerning commerce, navigation,
and establishment of consular rights. Beyond this, the clause as such is generally
formulated in a cautious way so that its applicability to only certain types of
advantages and concessions is rather obvious. This is especially true for the
most-favored-nation clause concerned with the exchange of goods, the only
clause which is of importance in this connection. As an example of the "normal"
type used at the time in question, the most-favored-nation clause included in the
Trade Agreement Between Germany and the Belgian-Luxembourgian Economic
Union, April 4, 1925, may be cited:
Les Produits du sol et de l'industrie de l'Union Economique
belgo-luxembourgeoise import~s en Allemagne, et les produits du sol
et de l'industrie de l'Allemagne import~s dans les territoires de l'Union
Economique belgo-luxembourgeoise, ne seront passibles de droits ni
m~mes produits du sol et de l'industrie
plus 6lev~s ni autres que les
52
d'un tiers pays quelconque.
This precise formulation of the clause became the rule after 1918. But
there were two exceptions: one was a number of old treaties of commerce,
which were still in force at the time in question and in which the most-favorednation standard was defined in very broad terms. The second exception was
a rather small number of new trade agreements for which the same was true.
Article 1 of the Trade Agreement Between Germany and Guatemala, October 4,
1924, may serve as an example:
The contracting Parties undertake to grant each other mostfavored-nation treatment in commercial consular and shipping questions, with the exception of coasting trade; for this purpose it is
understood that any right, exemption or privilege granted by one
of them to a third53Power shall ipso facto be accorded to the other
Contracting Party.
52. [1925] RGB1 II. 883-84, 37 L.N.T.S. 203, 207; even more precise was the so-called
"model clause," drafted by the Economic Committee of the League of Nations. See League
of Nations Economic Committee, Recommendations Relating to Tariff Policy and MostFavored-Nation Clause 11 (L.N. Pub. No. 1933.II.B.1).
53. [1925] RGBI II. 155, 52 L.N.T.S. 20, 25; as an example for a correspondingly
general obligation of the prewar period, reference may be made, e.g., to the Commercial
Treaty Between Germany and El Salvador, April 14, 1908, art. I, [1909] RGBI 405, 406;
3 Martens N.R.G. (3e sr.) 259, 260.
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When, during and after the war, more and more states proceeded to regulate
imports not only by tariffs but also by quantitative restrictions, the question
arose whether the most-favored trading partner could successfully protest
against the imposition of quotas discriminating against his export on the basis
of the most-favored-nation clause not especially drafted for this purpose.
So far as the relevant clause was, in its scope, expressly limited to tariffs and
other direct import or export charges, the answer to this question was apparently negative. As far as there existed most-favored-nation clauses framed
in very general language, the answer was not so clear. Nevertheless, after a
certain period of hesitation, practice and even theory gave a positive answer in
this case.54 Moreover, to avoid all possible doubts, the international practice
inserted at least into all new treaties a specific most-favored-nation or nondiscrimination clause concerned only with quantitative restrictions.Gr
The same question came up again when some years later an increasing
number of states introduced a system of exchange control and subjected their
foreign trade to this kind of regulation. Exchange control as practiced in most
cases is a quantitative restriction but a quantitative restriction of exchange, not
of trade. 56 That is the reason why exchange control could not fall under the
newly inserted treaty clauses very precisely framed only against direct quantitative restrictions of trade. But what about the applicability of most-favored-nation
clauses formulated in very broad terms? The effects of exchange control on
foreign trade, as discussed earlier, are very similar to those of quantitative restrictions. The administrative methods employed are very much the same
also. The main difference is, in practice, that in one case the necessary import
license is usually granted by some office related to the ministry of trade or
economy, whereas in the other case the ministry of finance issues the relevant
"currency license." Finally, the discriminatory effects of exchange control
on foreign trade are even more apparent than those in the case of quantitative
54. See League of Nations Economic Committee, Equality of States in the Present
State of International Commercial Relations: The Most-Favored-Nation Clause 13-14
(L.N. Pub. No. 1936.II.B.9.); League of Nations Economic, Financial and Transit Dep't,
Quantitative Trade Controls 25 (L.N. Pub. No. 1943.IIA.5.); Jaenicke, Diskriminierung
119-22 (1940); Nolde, Les effets de la clause de le nation le plus favorisle en matiare de
Commerce et de navigation, 38 Ann. Inst. de Droit Int'l 442-44 (1934). More critical
treatments include, e.g., Ito, La Clause de ]a Nation la plus favoris6e 221-29 (1930);
Snyder, The Most-Favored-Nation Clause 136-40 (1948); cf. Keltsch, Vblkerrechtliche
Schranken der Einfuhrkontingentierung 83-96 (1965) (contains exhaustive references).
55. See, e.g., Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between Germany and the United
Kingdom, Dec. 2, 1924, art. 10 (1) and (2), [1925J RGBI II. 777, 781, 43 L.N.T,S, 89, 95,
19 Martens N.R.G. (3e sr.) 643, 649:
(1) Trade and traffic between the territories of the two Contracting Parties
shall, as far as possible, not be impeded by any kind of import or export prohibitions
or restrictions.
(2) The two Contracting Parties agree to limit their right to impose prohibitions or restrictions upon import or export as far as possible to the following
cases, it being understood that such prohibitions or restrictions are extended
at the same time and in the same way to other foreign countries in which similar
conditions prevail....
56. For an example of a non-quantitative exchange restriction and a short discussion of the differences, see supra note 19.
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restrictions, because the purpose of exchange control can be reached in most cases
only by a careful differentiation between scarce and available currencies and
through a continued preference for imports from countries with available
currency to the detriment of imports from those countries with scarce currency.
One of the countries which felt very strongly the discriminatory effects
of exchange control on its foreign trade was the, United States. The dollar
after 1934 was the scarce currency par excellence in Europe. Therefore, the
United States was one of the first countries to characterize the discriminatory
effects of exchange control as a violation of its treaty rights, especially as a
violation of the most-favored-nation treatment inserted in a rather general
form into most of its commercial treaties, and to ask for immediate relief .5
The reaction of the trading partners concerned can be summarized as follows:
(1) the partner contested the fact of discrimination or promised relief58
so arguing on a purely factual basis;
(2) the partner conceded the fact of a discrimination against American
goods, but referred to the circumstances that forced him into this policy of
bilateral trade balancing and that for the time being there was no possibility of
redress-thus referring to a certain kind of undeserved state of emergency; 5 9
(3) the partner pointed to difficulties in his balance of payment situation and on this finding he based the opinion that under the prevailing economic
circumstances, the discrimination against American goods could be removed
effectively only if the United States itself would enlarge the receptivity of its
inland market for foreign imports as to correspond in volume to the American
overall amount of exports-this argument trying to shift the responsibility
for the continuing discrimination against American goods back to the United
60
States.
57. See the relevant d~marches of the United States regarding: Latvia, [1933) 2
For. Rel. U.S. 602-19; Estonia, [1934) 2 For. Rel. U.S. 129-33; Germany, [19351 2 For.
Rel. U.S. 438-77; Argentina, [19361 5 For. Rel. U.S. 200-19; Chile, [1937] 5 For. Rel.
U.S. 430-34. In all these cases the United States could refer to a most-favored-nation
clause not only concerned with tariffs and quantitative restrictions but framed in general
language. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights With Latvia,
April 20, 1928, art. VII(5), 45 Stat. 2641, 2644, 31 Martens N.R.G. (3e s6r.) 198, 201,
T.S. No. 765; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights With Estonia, Dec. 23,
e
1925, art. VII(4), 44 Stat. 2379, 2382, 18 Martens N.R.G. (3 s6r.) 275, 277, T.S. No. 736;
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights With Germany, Dec. 8, 1923, art.
VII(4), 44 Stat. 2132, 2137-38, 17 Martens N.R.G. (3e s6r.) 353, 359-60, T.S. No. 725;
Provisional Agreement With Chile, Sept. 28, 1931, sect. 2, 47 Stat. 2682, 35 Martens N.G.R.
(30 s~r.) 587, 588, E.A.S. No. 26; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation With
Argentina, July 27, 1853, art. III, 10 Stat. 1005, 1006-07, T.S. No. 4.
58. See, e.g., the note of the Latvian Foreign Ministry, [1933) 2 For. Rel. U.S. 609-11.
59. See, e.g., the note of the Estonian Foreign Office, [1935] 2 For. Rel. U.S. 199202; and the memorandum of the Argentine Ministry of Finance, [1936) 5 For. Rel. U.S.
202-03.
60. This was, for example, the German point of view; see the German statements in
[1934) 2 For. Rel. U.S. 461-67; [1935) 2 For. Rel. U.S. 448-51; [19361 2 For. Rel. U.S.
236-41.
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All three forms of reaction against the American protest have something
in common: they at least implicitly admit a violation of existing treaty obligations61 even if they try at the same time to excuse this violation of the law
by some economic arguments. Nobody, at least, rejected the complaint on legal
grounds. So the applicability of the broadly termed most-favored-nation clause
to the discriminatory effects of exchange control on foreign trade seems not
to have been put into question by state practice. The theory of international
law on the contrary was rather reluctant in answering the same question.
Even today, it seems to be inclined, if it takes up the question at all, to give
a negative answer, mostly without any substantiation.0 2 If one puts emphasis on the point that exchange control is a measure of monetary policy
and that because of this particular character, exchange control as well as its
discriminatory effects cannot be covered by a most-favored-nation clause conceived to apply only in the area of trade, the argument has, at first, a certain
persuasiveness. This seems to be especially true if the principle of the necessarily
restrictive interpretation of international treaty obligations, 3 which was at
least in the 1930's a kind of untouchable dogma, is taken into account. On
the other hand, if one puts emphasis only on the result, as apparently the practice
did, then there is no reason why an actual discrimination against certain goods
should not be regarded as a violation of the most-favored-nation clause because
its raison d'9tre originated not on the trade, but on the monetary policy
level. The wording of the most-favored-nation clauses in question does not
make any differentiation as to the causes behind the discrimination against
certain goods. As discussed before, the decision of the International Court of
Justice in the Morocco case 4 does not say very much about the compatibility
of exchange control with contractual commitments to equal treatment in a
more or less general fashion. The court refused expressly to broach this question because it was thought to be without any importance. But this very refusal seems to indicate also that the court did not pay too much attention to
the reason for and the character of the discriminatory measure in question, but
relied exclusively on the result as the only valid criterion for the decision.
Thus the court, in this case, apparently took the line of argument advanced here,
decided according to the practice, and did not share the hesitations of the
theory,0 5
61. The admission was expressly made in the note of the Estonian Foreign Office,
11935] 2 For. Rel. U.S. 200-02.

62. Cf. Jaenicke, Meistbegfingstigungsklausel, in 2 Strupp-Schocbauer, Wbrterbuch

des V6lkerrechts 500 (1961); Nussbaum, Money 475; also compare Mann, Recucil 70-71,
and Metzger, Exchange Controls and International Law, 1959 U. Ill. L.F. 311, at 315-18,
with the reasoning supra p. 391.
63. Cf. dictum in The S.S. Lotus, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10, at 18 (1927).
64. Cf. supra note 45.

65. Mann is certainly right when he stresses that the French argument, as actually made,
to justify the import prohibition in question as a necessary part of a necessary system
of exchange was neither exhaustive nor convincing; Mann, Recueil 60. Cf. the French
presentation of the problem, Morocco Case, 1 I.C.J. Pleadings 83; 2 id. 153-54 (1952).

He is also right in pointing out the danger of the assumption that "import control
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The importance of the question under consideration, at least for practical
purposes, should not be overemphasized. The most-favored-nation clause framed
in general terms was an exception to the commercial treaties in force in the
1930's. Moreover, at least in the first years, there was a considerable amount
of uncertainty about how and in what way the most-favored-nation standard
should be applied to the discriminatory effects of exchange control.6 6 Finally,
most of the countries practicing a system of exchange control very quickly
proceeded to put their foreign economic relations on a new platform of agreements more closely corresponding to the changed conception of foreign trade
policy, or at least to denounce their existing most-favored-nation obligations
67
where these were framed in general terms.
The result of the foregoing considerations seems to be the following: as
far as the introduction of a system of exchange control is concerned, no measurand exchange control are necessarily and invariably different and unconnected institutions."
Mann, Recueil 61. How dangerous and wrong this assumption is might be illustrated simply
by reference to GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XV, para. 9b, 61 Stat. A51, [1951] BGBI. Annex
I, 55 UTN.T.S. 250, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, which speaks of "the use . . of restrictions or
controls on imports or exports, the sole effect of which . . . is to make effective such
exchange controls or exchange restrictions."
66. The replacement of the "egalitarian" idea by the "proportional" notion of equality
is discussed infra pp. 402-07.
67. Thus, for example, upon request by Germany, the most-favored-nation clause
(art. VII, paras. 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7) of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular
Rights With Germany, Dec. 8, 1923, 44 Stat. 2132, 2137-39, [1925] RGB1 II. 795, 798,
17 Martens N.R.G. (3e s~r.) 353, 358-61, T.S. No. 725, ceased to have force by an
agreement between the parties of Oct. 11, 1935, 49 Stat. 3258, [19351 RGBI II. 743, T.S. No.
897. By the "agreement" Germany deprived the United States of the possibility of characterizing the continuing discrimination against American goods as a violation of treaty
rights. Cf. the history of this amendment and the considerations on both sides behind this
development, [1934] 2 For. Rel. U.S. 448-69; [19351 2 For. Rel. U.S. 438-76. Similar
tendencies regarding Estonia appear in [1936] 2 For. Rel. U.S. 66-72; and [1937] 2 For.
Rel. U.S. 259-74.
Insofar as the most-favored-nation clause was, on the other hand, applicable only
to tariffs and similar charges, thus prohibiting discrimination only in this area, the countries
exercising a system of exchange control were not at all interested in changing the corresponding clauses, because these clauses were at least not harmful to their purposes. For
example, Germany even after 1934 concluded a series of new commercial treaties with
most-favored-nation clauses concerning customs duties, etc. See Commercial Treaty
Between Germany and Chile, Dec. 26, 1934, art. 2, [1935] RGBI II. 26, 27-28, 39 Martens
N.R.G. (3e sr.) 310, 312-13; German-Polish Economic Treaty, Nov. 4, 1935, art. 1,
[1935] RGB1 II. 767, 768. The doubtful practical value of these most-favored-nation
clauses for the trading partners of Germany at a time when quantitative restrictions and
exchange control were the real barriers to international trade is discussed in Bloch, Chronik
der Staatsvertrige, 6 Zeitschrift filr auslindisches Recht und V6lkerrecht 113 (1936).
A most-favored-nation clause limited to tariffs operated unilaterally in favor of the
country exercising a system of exchange control in all cases where the other party to the
treaty did not practice any form of quantitative restrictions or exchange control. Under
these circumstances the other party had to pass along all advantages granted by it to
third parties in the tariff area, without hope of getting any equivalent benefits. This was
the reason, inter alia, why upon request of the United States, the Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation With Italy, Feb. 26, 1871, 17 Stat. 845, 1 Martens N.R.G. (2e s6r.) 57, T.S. No.
177, was suspended by an agreement of Dec. 15, 1936, the text of which appears in [1936]
2 For. Rel. U.S. 356. Art. VI of the treaty of 1871 contained a most-favored-nation clause
applicable only to tariffs and quantitative restrictions, which, by the time of the suspension,
was working exclusively in favor of Italy. For the background of the suspension, see
[1935] 2 For. Rel. U.S. 517-43; and [1936] 2 For. Rel. U.S. 340-60. See also Temporary
Commercial Arrangement With Italy, Dec. 16, 1937, 51 Stat. 361, EA.S. No. 116.
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able limitation on the state's discretion by international law has been found.
As far as the handling of exchange control is concerned, the only limitation
imposed by general international law is the rather ineffective notion of "abus
de droit." No other limitation could be found in customary international law.
In international treaty law, only the most-favored-nation clause formulated
in general terms proved to be at least a possible basis for characterizing specific
discriminatory effects of exchange control on foreign trade as violations of international treaty obligations. But the importance of this contractual limitation
upon the state's freedom of action was confined to the rather exceptional cases
in which such a general obligation of equal treatment actually existed, and it
was also hampered by the fact that most of the states exercising exchange control withdrew, in one way or another, successfully from this treaty obligation.
VI.

THE EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN AFTER 1934 To CARRY INTO EFFECT
THE PRINCIPLE OF NONDIScRIuNATION AGAINST THE CONSEQUENCES OF EXCHANGE CONTROL

Considering the lack of an effective international law remedy against
the discriminatory consequences of exchange control, the trading partners of
those countries practicing exchange control had only two choices: to yield
to this development and try to protect their own economic interests by way of
new bilateral agreements embodying the quota system, or to attempt to defend
the basic principles of multilateral and nondiscriminatory international trade
against the consequences of exchange control, even if this attitude was on a
short term basis detrimental to their own economic interests. It is obvious
that the latter way was open only to economically strong countries or to
those countries which were not dependent on the markets of the states
imposing exchange control.
Forced to make this kind of choice, most of the trading partners of
Germany, to fall back again on the German example, in the years after 1934
decided to protect their own economic interests in the German market by
concluding the new type of short-term trade and the related payments or
clearing agreements. 68 The most striking characteristic of this new type of
contractual regulation of international trade relations was the binding of the
volume of imports to that of exports, the purpose being to bring about a
strictly bilateral balance of trade. As an example of this new characteristic
feature, article 1(1) of the Payment Agreement Between Germany and Canada,
October 22, 1936, may be cited:
The German Government shall make available for the purchase of
Canadian goods
the foreign exchange accruing from German exports
69
to Canada.
68. About the complementary mechanism of these "double agreements," see Wabnttz,
op. cit. supra note 30, at 3-9.
69. [19361 RGB1 II. 350, 173 L.N.T.S. 311, 312. For further examples see Schneider,
Die Welthandel im Clearingsverkehr passim (1937).
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These and similar treaty clauses are of no importance for the question
under consideration. They may represent an effective protection of certain
reciprocal economic interests. But the idea of a nondiscriminatory generalization of bilaterally bargained advantages to third trading partners is necessarily
foreign to this type of treaty clause. The most-favored-nation clause, the very
function of which in the classical commercial treaty was to put into effect
treaty advantages for third parties on the sole ground that these third states
had a most-favored-nation position in relation to one of the parties to the
treaty, was consistently replaced by a short-term denouncing clause. This
clause allowed each party to the treaty to ask for an immediate resumption
of treaty negotiations if the party felt its interests were injured by the factual
development of the mutual trade relations or by the bilateral advantages
granted by the other party to a third country. 7°
A. The Efforts of the United States To Protect Multilateral and Free
Trade Against the DiscriminatoryEffects of Exchange Control
The United States decided to follow the second path. On the basis of the
Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 19 3 4 ,r" it tried to enforce the principle
of nondiscrimination against the effects of exchange control by means of
a very large number of new trade agreements, which in most cases contained
a specific clause to this effect.
A closer examination of the relevant provisions in the trade agreements
of the United States after 1934 shows that there were three standard clauses
dealing particularly with the effects of exchange control. One clause succeeded the other after having served for a certain period. The first clause to
be used provided:
The tariff advantages and other benefits provided for in this
Agreement are granted by the United States of America and the
Republic of Honduras to each other subject to the condition that if the
Government of either country shall establish or maintain, directly or indirectly, any form of control of foreign exchange, it shall administer such
control so as to insure that the nationals and commerce of the other
country will be granted a fair and equitable share in the allotment
of exchange.
With respect to the exchange made available for commercial
transactions, it is agreed that the Government of each country shall
be guided in the administration of any form of control of foreign
exchange by the principle that, as nearly as may be determined,
the share of the total available exchange which is allotted to the other
70. The German-Canadian Payment Agreement, Oct. 22, 1936, art. X, [19361 RGBI

II. 353, 173 L.N.T.S. 316, 38 Martens N.R.G. (3e s6r.) 200, 204-05, provided that a contracting party "considering itself at a disadvantage through developments unfavorable
to its interests or through the adoption by the other Party of measures of an economic
nature. . ." might request a satisfactory adjustment of the matter within four weeks. If
negotiations did not lead to a satisfactory adjustment within this period, the party could
terminate the agreement by simple notification within six weeks.

71. 48 Stat. 943 (1934).
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country shall not be less than the share employed in a previous
representative period prior to the establishment of any exchange control
for the settlement of commercial obligations to the nationals of such
other country.
The Government of each country will give sympathetic consideration to any representations which the other Government may make
in respect of the application of the provisions of this Article, and
if, within thirty days after the receipt of such representations, a
satisfactory adjustment has not been reached with respect to such
representations, the Government making them may, within fifteen days
after the expiration of the aforesaid period of thirty days, terminate
this Article "or this Agreement in its entirety on thirty days' written
notice. 72
The first and most important consequence of the introduction of this
clause into a trade agreement seems to be that, for the treaty relationship
in question, the limitation of the partner's freedom of action in the area
of monetary policy became unequivocal. By this same clause every doubt as
to the applicability of the most-favored-nation standard to the discriminatory
effects of exchange control because of the different basis of discriminationhere nationality, there affiliation with a certain currency area-should be
removed. 73 To the obligation of equal treatment on the trade level, there is
72. Reciprocal Trade Agreement [hereinafter cited Recip. Trade Agr.] With Honduras,
Dec. 18, 1935, art. VIII, 49 Stat. 3851, 3858-59, 167 L.N.T.S. 313, E.A.S. No. 86; see
also Recip. Trade Agr. With Sweden, May 25, 1935, art. IX, 49 Stat. 3755, 3762, 161
L.N.T.S. 109, E.A.S. No. 79; Recip. Trade Agr. With Canada, Nov. 15, 1935, art. IX,
49 Stat. 3960, 3964, 168 L.N.T.S. 355, 400, E.A.S. No. 91; Recip. Trade Agr. With Guatemala, April 24, 1936, art. IX, 49 Stat. 3989, 3995-96, 170 L.N.T.S. 345, E.A.S. No. 92;
Recip. Trade Agr. With Nicaragua, Mar. 11, 1936, art. IX, 50 Stat. 1413, 1419-20, 173
L.N.T.S. 141, EA.S. No. 95; Recip. Trade Agr. With Finland, May 18, 1936, art. X,
50 Stat. 1436, 1441-42, 172 L.N.T.S. 97, E.A.S. No. 97; Recip. Trade Agr. With El Salvador, Feb. 19, 1937, art. IX, 50 Stat. 1564, 1568, 179 L.N.T.S., 219, E.A.S. No. 101; Recip.
Trade Agr. With Costa Rica, Nov. 28, 1937, art. IX, 50 Stat. 1582, 1588-89, 181 L.N.T.S.
183, E.A.S. No. 102; Agreement With Czechoslovakia, Mar. 29, 1935, para. 2, 49 Stat.
3674, 159 LN.T.S. 155, E.AS. No. 74 (contains only part 1 of the standard clause).
73. But see Mann, Recueil 70-71; and Metzger, supra note 62, at 315-18. Mann raises
his doubts (discussed supra pp. 391-92) expressly against this form of a most-favorable-nation
clause, framed to apply in the monetary area. According to him, the clause grants protection
only where discrimination is based on nationality rather than on a special currency. If
this opinion could not be accepted before, in the discussion of the general form of the mostfavored-nation clause, here it leads to really untenable results. The acceptance of this
opinion would mean that all these clauses are of no importance and offer no protection at
all, because nationality is (as Mann himself points out, Recueil 71) rarely ever used as a
basis for discrimination in the context of exchange control. But one of the basic principles
in the interpretation of treaties, and valuable also in international law, is the rule that
an ambiguous clause is to be construed so as to implement the purpose of the clause and
not in such a way that it becomes meaningless. Thus even a very careful application of
the maxim "ut res magis vaeat quam pereat" (cf. Bernhardt, Die Auslegung V6lkerrechtlicher
Vertrlige 88-96 (1963); McNair, The Law of Treaties 383-92 (2d ed. 1961)) will lead to
the conclusion that the prohibition of discrimination under discussion is not limited to
cases of discrimination on the basis of political nationality, but that the term "nationality"
must be interpreted for this purpose as "monetary nationality," i.e., residence in or provenance from a particular currency area. Otherwise, it would be hard to understand why
this form of protection of international trade against the discriminatory effects of
exchange control is still used today. The clear intention is to do something more than
insert a useless article into international agreements. Metzger, supra note 62, at 315-16,
demonstrates very well the "usefulness" of this type of provision as interpreted by him and
by Mann.
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added a similar obligation on the monetary level. The purpose of this obligation was to prevent the advantages granted to exports and imports from being
Finally, an example of post-World War II treaty practice may be cited to sustain the
interpretation of the relevant most-favored-nation clauses given here. This same example
is cited by Mann, Recueil 72, as a confirmation of his different interpretation of the
clauses.
The example is the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation With Germany, Oct.
29, 1954, art. XII (1) and (3) (and para. 14 of the accompanying Protocol), 7 U.S.T.
& O.I.A. 1839, 1852-53, 1907, [19563 BGBI II., at 493-94, 503, 273 U.N.T.S. 3, at 18, 42,
T.I.A.S. No. 3593:
Art. XII (1) Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded
national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment by the other Party with
respect to the assumption of undertakings for, and the making of, payments, remittances, and transfers of moneys and financial instruments.
(3) Neither Party may, with respect to the other Party, in any manner
impose exchange restrictions which are unnecessarily detrimental to or arbitrarily
discriminate against the claims, investments, transportation, trade or other interests
of nationals and companies of such other Party or their competitive position.
Should either Party impose exchange restrictions with respect to the other Party,
it will remove them as rapidly as it is able to do so considering its economic condition.
14. Article XII, paragraph 1, is not concerned with rules regarding currencies as such and therefore does not preclude differential treatment of different
currencies. It is only concerned with the rights of nationals and companies under
whatever foreign exchange regulations may be in effect and is only designed to
preclude discriminations against nationals and companies on a nationality basis
in the application of the foreign exchange regulations.
Para. 14 refers expressly only to art. XII(1), and not to the second of the paragraphs quoted
above (art. XII(3)). Mann notes this omission, but does not take it as very important;
Recueil 72. He relies on para. 14 of the protocol rather as a general confirmation of his
interpretation. The contrary seems to be true, for the following reasons.
First, the text of art. XII(1) as such and its interrelation with art. XII(3) is at
least at first not very clear. Is para. (1) concerned with exchange control in general or only
with its technical side, with the administration of exchange regulations, etc.? There are
three referents which make it rather obvious that the latter is true: para. 14 states expressly
that art. XII(1) deals only with the administration of exchange regulations and not with
their formulation, or with the economic or political decisions behind them. In addition
there is the assurance of national treatment besides most-favored-nation treatment in art.
XII(1). As has been seen supra, note 47, this assurance makes sense (if at all) only as
far as the administrative side of exchange control is concerned. Also there would be an
inconsistency between paras. (1) and (3) of art. XII if both were concerned with exactly
the same subject. Para. (1) grants national most-favored-nation treatment. Para. (3) promises
only that exchange control, if introduced, will not be unnecessarily detrimental or arbitrarily
discriminatory. These are two rather different standards.
Second, if art. XII(1) and (3) are concerned with two different questions (i.e., two
different sides of exchange control) it seems to be clear that para. 14 is not applicable to
art. XII(3). On the contrary, in stressing the point that, as far as the technical side of
exchange control is concerned, only discrimination on a nationality basis is unlawful under
the treaty, para. 14 implies that, as far as art. XII(3), the basic clause dealing with exchange
control, is concerned, not only the nationality but also the currency test can be used to determine whether a certain exchange restriction represents a violation under art. XII(3). In other
words, the United States could protest under art. XII(3) not only when Germany discriminates against American goods on a nationality basis, but also when the discrimination is directed against American goods because payment for them has to be made in
American dollars, provided that the discrimination is arbitrary within the meaning
of the article.
Third, para. 14 of the protocol thus seems to indicate that, as long as there is no
express provision to the contrary, a most-favored-nation or nondiscrimination clause
dealing with foreign exchange control has normally to be understood as excluding discrimination not only on a nationality but also on a currency area basis. Art. XII(3)
points in the same direction. Interpreted in the way Mann and Metzger apparently would
have it, art. XII(3) becomes a rather meaningless repetition.
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neutralized by measures taken against the currency in which payment had to be
made for the exported or imported goods.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the prohibition of discrimination in the handling of exchange control did not take the classical form of a mostfavored-nation clause but speaks of a "fair and equitable share in the allotment
of exchange." This rather general wording is given, as far as the payment of
commercial transactions is concerned, a certain precision in describing the mode
of calculation which should be applied. This formulation of the prohibition of
discrimination was based on the experience gained from the application of the
most-favored-nation clause in its original form to quantitative restrictions. Mostfavored-nation treatment, as applied to its original field of custom duties and
other charges imposed on importation and exportation, had the meaning of "egalitarian" equality, in the sense that the goods imported from the "most-favored"
trading partner were subjected to exactly the same amount of custom duties
or other charges as similar goods imported from the best-treated third
partner. It is obivous that the transfer of this concept of equality to the area
of quantitative restrictions would lead to results which are contrary to the
purpose of the most-favored-nation standard, 74 which is to leave untouched
the different competitive positions of goods originating in different foreign
countries. 75 That is why, as far as the area of quantitative restrictions of
international trade is concerned, the concept of an "egalitarian" equality
was very soon replaced by the idea of a "proportional" equality.7 0 The main
feature which was taken into account in defining the new concept of proportional equality was the share in the importation of a specific commodity
the county asking for equal treatment had held in a "representative
period" before the introduction of quantitative restrictions. To make the
distinction between the notions of egalitarian equality in the area of tariffs
and proportional equality in, the field of import quotas apparent in termin74. The example very frequently given is that of the "German butter quota." In
1932 Germany allowed Finland to export to Germany an annual quota of 5000 tons of
butter at a specially low tariff rate. This concession was later generalized to all countries
with whom Germany had most-favored-nation agreements. This extension restored a formal
equality of treatment, but actually it introduced a discrimination against Germany's main
suppliers of butter, namely Holland and Denmark. The discrimination was caused by the
fact that 5000 tons of butter represented a very large part of the imports from Finland,
but a very small proportion of the imports from Holland and Denmark. This example
makes clear that import quotas distributed among different countries, as long as they
are not brought into proportion with actual transactions in the product, lead necessarily
to a weakening of the competitive position of the main supplier countries, and so to a
violation of the ratio of the most-favored-nation treatment. Cf., e.g., Snyder, op. cit. supra
note 54, at 137-38. For an example concerning a Czechoslovakian "plum quota," see [1933]
2 For. Rel. U.S. 478-83.
75. Cf. League of Nations Economic Committee, Recommendations Relating to
Tariff Policy and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause 12 (L.N. Pub. No. 1933.II.B.1.);
Bonhoeffer, Die Meistbegiinstigung im V6lkerrecht 44-45 (1930); Jaenicke, Diskriminierung
119M23 (1940); Nolde, 38 Ann. Institut de Droit Int'l 442-44 (1934) ; Snyder, op. cit. supra
note 54, at 138-39.
76. For more arguments in favor of this replacement, see Bonhoeffer, op. cit. supra note
75, at 44-45.
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ology, in the second case the term "most-favored-nation treatment" -was
generally replaced by the more basic term "nondiscriminatory" or "equal
77
treatment."
The introduction of the idea of proportional equality into the field of
exchange control was based on the same grounds. In fact, exchange control,
if exercised as in most cases through the administrative allocation of foreignexchange quotas, is only another example of a quantitative control in the
sense that the question of how much of the demand for international transactions should be satisfied "is determined in quantitative terms through discretionary action of the authorities," 78 whereas in the case of tariffs, the 'flow
of goods is regulated through a manipulation df the price of ihese goods
within the market of the importing state.
The progress achieved through the development of this new clause should
nevertheless not be misunderstood. It did not secure the same kind of protection against discriminatory treatment that the most-favored-nation standard
had brought in the field of tariffs. First, it should not be overlooked that, as
far as the factual situation is concerned, control is much more easily exercised
over the importation and exportation of goods than over the different, possible
methods of payment transactions. In the second place, there is much more
room for successful evasion.79 There -is
also the great difficulty of the calculation of the right proportional share in the allotment of exchange even if the
trading partners have reached an understanding as to the years before the
introduction of exchange control which should be regarded as the "representative period."8 0 Furthermore, the "representative period" test does not take into
account either the possiblity of an expansion of the favored trading partner's
economy, bringing about an increase of its export capacity, or the possibility
of a decrease of this capacity and its natural effect on the relative trade position of other interested trading partners.8 ' The test as a whole is rather static
by its very nature and thus not too appropriate, as a formula for problems
involving the dynamics of international economic relations.8 2 Moreover, the
part of the clause allowing short-term denouncement of all treaty obligations
indicated that even the parties to the treaty were not really convinced that
they had found a clause effectively and definitively banning all the dangers
that exchange control creates for international trade. Finally, the phase "shall
be guided" in the second paragraph of the clause shows clearly that the
parties did not intend to impose very strict rules of behavior but to formulate
77.
78.

For examples, see Keltsch, op. cit. supra note 38, at 96-104'.
Cf. International Monetary Fund, First Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions

3-16 (1950).
79. This point is emphasized by Hawkins, Commercial Treaties and Agreements: Principes and Practice 196 (1951).
80. Cf. id. at 165.
81. Id. at 164-65; Snyder, op. cit. supra note 54, at 139.
82. Cf. Viner, in League of Nations Economic, Financial and 'Transit Dep't, Trade
Regulations Between Free-Market and Controlled Economies 61-62 (LN. Pub. No. 1943
II.A.4.).
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some guidelines the specification and enforcement of which they left to later
diplomatic negotiations. Nevertheless, all these doubts as to the effectiveness and
the appropriateness of the protection reached do not deny the basic progress
achieved by this first proper attempt at a contractual and rather precise limitation on the discriminatory effects of exchange control.
The second standard clause, used by the United States, was drafted as
follows:
In the event that Government of the United States of America
or the Government of the Republic of Ecuador establishes or maintains, directly or indirectly, any form of control of the means of international payment, it shall, in the administration of such control:
(a) Impose no prohibition, restriction, nor delay on the transfer
of payment for imported articles the growth, produce, or manufacture
of the other country, or of payments necessary for and incidental to
the importation of such articles;
(b) Accord unconditionally, with respect to rates of exchange
and taxes or surcharges on exchange transactions in connection with
payments for or payments necessary and incidental to the importation of articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of the other
country, treatment no less favorable than that accorded in connection
with the importation of any article whatsoever the growth, produce,
or manufacture of any third country; and
(c) Accord unconditionally, with respect to all rules and formalities applying to exchange transaction in connection with payments
for or payment necessary and incidental to the importation of articles
the growth, produce, or manufacture of the other country, treatment
no less favorable than that accorded in connection with the importation of the like
articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of any
83
third country.
The most remarkable part of this provision is its section (a). This section
lacks any reference to the principle of proportional or any other form of
equality. It does much more than demand nondiscriminatory treatment. It
simply excludes any regulation of importation by the way of allocation of
foreign currency or by other quantitative methods of exchange control. The
result is reached by the reciprocal promise not to interfere with the exporter's
claim to prompt and full payment for all goods once they are lawfully imported into the country. This promise means nothing less than to declare
that under the treaty the administrative allotment of exchange, which was the
most usual way of putting exchange control into effect, is no longer a permissible way of limiting foreign imports. This function had to be taken over again
83. Recip. Trade Agr. With Ecuador, Aug. 6, 1938, art. X, 53 Stat. 1951, 1959-60,
193 L.N.T.S. 85, E.A.S. No. 133. Similarly formulated are: Provisional Commercial Agreement With Greece, Nov. 15, 1938, art. III, 53 Stat. 2046, 2047, 195 L.N.T.S. 145, 147,
E.A.S. No. 137; Recip. Trade Agr. With Czechoslovakia, March 7, 1938, art. X, 53 Stat.

2293, 2301, E.A.S. No. 147; Recip. Trade Agr. With Venezuela, No. 6, 1939, art. IX, 54
Stat. 2375, 2379, E.A.S. No. 180; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation With
Liberia, Aug. 8, 1938, art. X, 54 Stat. 1739, 1743-44, 38 Martens N.R.G. (30 s6r.) 684,
687-88, T.S. No. 956.
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mainly by quantitative restrictions.8 4 At first, this seems to be only a
shifting of the problem, because the provisions relevant to quantitative
restrictions again refer to the principle of proportional equality and the "representative period" test. s5 But in fact this formulation represented a great
step forward. The practical advantage was, as indicated above, that it was
much easier to control the observance of a treaty obligation concerned with
exports and imports than one concerned with financial transactions. This again
meant a more effective protection of the right to nondiscriminatory treatment. In addition, the articles relating to quantitative restrictions contained
a special publicity obligation as to the form and the scope of the regulations
of quotas actually applied at a given moment. 86 But apart from this, the
important progress of this clause (compared to the situation under the aforementioned) was the fact that the allotment of currency quotas as the most
common and most dangerous form of exchange control is declared unlawful
as a method of regulating foreign trade. The parties to the treaty in question
thus agreed again to regulate the interchange of goods between the two countries
mainly by means of tariffs and quantitative restrictions, both being measures
taken on the trade level, and not by way of decisions taken and carried out
on the level of monetary policy and law.
As great as may have been the theoretical progress of this formula, in
practice it did not prove to be very successful. Its applicability was limited
from the beginning to those trading partners of the United States which did
not rely on a system of exchange control by exchange quota allocation at all,
or were willing to give it up, or which at least left payments connected with
foreign trade outside the field of its application. But this type of trading
partner became extremely rare. For this reason, the United States, in recognizing "that this article, in the form in which it is drafted, is somewhat too
rigid to meet existing conditions,"8' 7 proceeded to replace this clause again
by a less rigid third formula, which was worded as follows:
1. If the Government of either country establishes or maintains any form of control of the means of international payment, it
shall accord unconditional most-favored-nation treatment to the commerce of the other country with respect to all aspects of such control.
2. The Government establishing or maintaining such control
shall impose no prohibition, restriction or delay on the transfer of
payment for any article the growth, produce or manufacture of the
84. Most-favored-nation treatment with respect to manipulation of exchange rates
and taxes on exchange transactions is agreed upon in para. (b). These measures too fall
under the term "exchange control"; cf. supra notes 5, 16. So in fact the clause does
not totally prohibit exchange restrictions as a means of intervention in the process of
importation of goods and their payment; but it does represent a very important step in
that direction.
85. See, e.g., Recip. Trade Agr. With Ecuador, Aug. 6, 1938, art. VIII(1) (b), 53
Stat. 1951, 1957, 193 L.N.T.S. 85, EA.S. No. 133.
86. See id., art. VIII(1)(a), (c).
87. U.S. Dep't State, Memorandum to the Ecuadorian Embassy, Aug. 21, 1941, [1941)
7 For. Rel. U.S. 303.
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other country which is not imposed on the transfer of payment for
the like article the growth, produce or manufacture of any third
country. With respect to rates of exchange and with respect to taxes
or charges on exchange transactions, articles the growth, produce
or manufacture of the other country shall be accorded unconditionally
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to the like articles the
growth, produce or manufacture of any third country. The foregoing provisions shall also extend to the application of such control
to payments necessary for or incidental to the importation of articles
the growth, produce or manufacture of the other country. In general,
the control shall be administered so as not to influence to the disadvantage of the other country the competitive relationships between
articles the growth, produce or manufacture of the territories of that
country and like articles the growth, produce or manufacture of third
countries. 88
This clause became not only embodied in the few trade agreements concluded after the outbreak of World War 1I,89 but also replaced some of the
earlier clauses of the second type above.00
The "regress" in the formulation of this clause compared to the content
of the second type of clause is apparent: a section similar to section (a) of that
clause is missing. So exchange control in all its possible forms is recognized
again as a legitimate way of regulating foreign trade relations. The scope
of reciprocal obligations undertaken in this formula corresponds basically
to those under the first clause referred to above. The main difference in its
formulation is, apart from the omission of the rather weak "shall be guided"
formulation, the replacement of the notion of "fair and equitable share" by
the most-favored-nation formula. This change in formulation does not seem
to have any relevance to the substance because it is made quite clear that
the most-favored-nation clause has to be understood as referring to proportional,
and not to egalitarian, equality of treatment. The idea of proportional equality,
on the other hand, is no longer defined by reference to a "representative period"
but by taking into account the "competitive relationships" of the imports
88. Redp. Trade Agr. With Uruguay, July 21, 1942, art. IV, 56 Stat. 1624, 1629-30,
120 U.N.T.S. 211, 216-17, E.A.S. No. 276.
89. See Recip. TradeAgr. With Argentina, Oct. 14, 1941, art. IV, 56 Stat. 1685,
1690-91, 119 U.N.T.S. 193, 198-99, E.A.S. No. 277; Recip. Trade Agr. With Mexico, Dec. 23,
1942, art. IV, 57 Stat. 833,837-38, 13 U.N.T.S. 231, 234-35, E.A.S. No. 311; Recip. Trade
Agr. With Iceland, Aug. 27, 1943, art. IV, 57 Stat. 1075, 1080-82, 29 U.N.T.S. 317, 322-23,
E.A.S. No. 342; Recip. Trade Agr. With Iran, April 8, 1943, art. IV, 58 Stat. 1322, 1325,
106 U.N.T.S. 172, 176-77, E.A.S. No. 410. It is interesting that Argentina as well as Uruguay
had'to limit immediately the application of the most-favored-nation clause granted to the

United States, insofar as the treatment given to Great Britain in exchange control matters
was concerned. According to notes attached to the two agreements, this treatment was regarded as an exceptional measure not falling within the clause; see the respective exchanges
of notes in 56 Stat. 1676-84, E..S. No. 277, at 70-71; and 56 Stat. 1744-58, E.AS. No. 276,
at 56-57.
90. See, e.g., the Agreement modifying the 1938 Trade Agreement With Ecuador,
Mar. 2, 1942, 56 Stat. 1472, 105 U.N.T.S. 195, E.A.S. No. 248; see also the Second Supplementary Agreement With Cuba, Dec. 23, 1941, 55 Stat. 1449, 119 U.N.T.S. 313, E.A.S.
No. 229.
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in question compared to imports of the same kind from third countries. The
replacement of the "representative period" test by this new formula was again
based on the experience that the first clause 'had proved to be too inflexible.
The new test leaves much more room for adjustment to the actual economic
situation in the process of allocating exchange quotas and so represents notable
progress compared to the rather rigid test applied earlier. 91
If one tries to summarize the efforts of the United States, documented in
the treaty provisions discussed, to limit the discriminatory effects of exchange
control on international trade as a whole, it seems that they represent a
step forward at least in three different aspects: (1) it became clear once and
for all that the principle of nondiscrimination has to be respected also as
far as the state's decisions on the monetary level are concerned, because otherwise nondiscriminatory treatment, even if applied carefully on the trade level,
will be made illusory, and the treaties concluded after 1934 tried to articulate
remedies corresponding to this finding; (2) in the process of articulating these
remedies certain basic conceptions were developed as to how to achieve their
purpose in the most effective way; (3) the United States succeeded in embody91. It may be mentioned that the third clause raises another argument against the
position of Mann, Recueil 70-74, on the significance (or better insignificance) of a mostfavored-nation clause relating to exchange control. Mann cites the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation With Italy, Feb. 2, 1948, art. XVII(2), 63 Stat. 2255, 2280,
79 U.N.T.S. 171, 198, T.I.A.S. No. 1965:
2. Financial transactions between territories of the two High Contracting Parties
shall be accorded by each High Contracting Party treatment no less favorable
than that accorded to like transactions between the territories of such High
Contracting Party and the territories of any third country.
Mann argues that this is, "in view of the character of exchange restrictions," probably
the most far-reaching formulation of the most-favored-nation standard, because it makes
specific reference to non-discrimination "on a territorial basis." He continues: "A state
subscribing to this clause would seem to have accepted the heavy burden of refraining
from any discrimination between 'soft' and 'hard' currencies."
In addition to the arguments made above against the position of Mann in general,
there are two more objections against the validity of this particular point. One is that
the same treaty uses the same "territorial" language not only in reference to financial
problems, but also in regulating trade relations. The clause, concerning customs, as well
as the one "outlawing" quantitative trade restrictions, expressly mention "the territories
of the other High Contracting Party" (art. XII(1) and (3)). This seems to be a rather
strong indication that the parties perhaps wanted to use a more precise, and by now
quite common, formulation of the "classical" most-favored-nation standard; the formula
was, however, a standard clause, used everywhere in the treaty and used without 'the
intention of opening up a completely new dimension for its application, as far as exchange
control is concerned.
A second argument against this formula being more extensive than the earlier "classical" model can be drawn from the third clause discussed supra. This clause refers in the
last sentence of the second paragraph to "articles the growth, produce or manufacture of
the territories of that country," thus also introducing a "territorial" instead of a "national"
element. But it is hardly questionable that the function of this sentence is merely to
reformulate the purpose of the whole article, to make it clear, to give an indication of how
to implement 'it, and not *to add an entirely new dimension to the importance of the
article. In short, the function of this sentence was certainly not to make the article, which
before was almost useless, finally workable and worth putting into the treaty. Also there is no
indication whatever that the United States felt it bad achieved by this new formulation the
goal of the clause which they had included in their commercial treaties in a slightly differefit
-and much more severe-form for almost ten'Years.
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ing these basic conceptions into quite a number of international agreements
and so made them accepted, both as the expression of a sound principle of
trade policy, and as binding obligations by many countries.
On the other hand, the effort of the United States shows quite clearly
the almost unsolvable dilemma everyone has to face who tries to reconcile
exchange control and the principle of nondiscrimination. For an economist,
every conceivable system of exchange control is necessarily discriminatory,
because it always leads to a distortion of the market, and always falsifies the
play of supply and demand.9 2 For a lawyer concerned with the effects
of exchange control on international trade, the picture is not exactly the same.
First he is concerned only with discrimination based on "nationality", that is,
based on the origin of the goods in question in different countries. He is-and
has to be-alarmed only when country A treats the same goods coming from
countries B and C in a different way, not because there is any distinction in
quality, but just because of their different origin. And there is still another
limitation to his concern, namely that discrimination as such, even if based
on "nationality," is not contrary to international law unless (except for some
extreme cases) he finds a special treaty clause making equal treatment mandatory between the two countries in question. So it is very well possible that
something which an economist qualifies as a clear case of discrimination is
none to the lawyer; and even if it is a discrimination for him too, it might
not be objectionable according to his standards. The treaty practice of the
United States which was discussed above gives a good example of the possible
difference in appreciation of the same situation by economic and legal standards.
As far as legal understanding is concerned, the treaty provisions discussed
provided an obligation for the trading partners of the United States not to
discriminate against it as far as their exchange control regulations had
any effect on the trade between the countries. According to economic standards
these provisions, on the other hand, do not represent an effort to promote the
principle of nondiscrimination in international trade, but, as Viner has clearly
pointed out, have to be regarded as an attempt to secure preferential treatment for the United States. 93 The reason for this quite different appreciation
is the fact that the countries concerned were not all in the financial or economic
position to generalize the "nondiscriminatory" treatment they promised the
United States to all their trading partners, because the non-convertibility of
most of the currencies at that time forced them to make a distinction between
"hard" and "soft" currencies and to maintain this distinction rather than worry
about its discriminatory effects.94
92. See supra pp. 386-87 and note 32.
93. League of Nations Economic, Financial and Transit Dep't, Trade Regulations
Between Free-Market and Controlled Economies 52 (L.N. Pub. No. 1943.II.AA.).
94. A good illustration of this economic impossibility is the example of Argentina and
Uruguay, cited supra note 89. These countries were not able to extend the treatment they
granted Great Britain as the most-favored-nation in exchange control matters even to
one additional trading partner with a "hard" currency, the United States.

408

EXCHANGE CONTROL

This difference in appreciation of the same situation makes it quite clear
that as far as legal standards are concerned, a nondiscriminatory system of
exchange control is conceivable at least in theory, even if the country which
is introducing and handling the control is bound by treaty obligations toward
all its trading partners not to discriminate against them. This system presupposes the full convertibility of the currencies of all trading partners involved. It presupposes further that the country in question does not introduce
exchange control to protect certain interests, certain industries or other means
of production, but solely because of overall balance-of-payment reasons. In
practice these conditions until now have never been met. There is always a
strong economic necessity-actual or fictitious-to distinguish between "hard"
and "soft" currencies. So in practice, it is impossible to avoid a certain
amount of discrimination as between currencies and goods of a given "nationality," and the only way of avoiding legal disputes as a consequence of this
discrimination is not to assume a treaty obligation for nondiscriminatory treatment in the first place, or at least to select very carefully the trading partners
with which a nondiscriminatory relationship seems economically possible.
These and many other possible arguments make it quite obvious that for
a lawyer as well as for an economist, the only way to reconcile the principle
of nondiscrimination and exchange control in the final analysis is to abolish
exchange control as completely as possible and to replace it with other
means of regulating the flow of international trade. This apparent necessity
is the reason why the efforts of the United States between 1934 and 1944,
as successful as they might have proved for the protection of American interests in a given case, could not possibly achieve the declared aim of the
American foreign trade policy, the reinstallation of multilateralism and nondiscrimination as the basis of international trade. 95 This reinstallation presupposed at least convertibility of the main currencies or some other form of a
multilateral system of payments. The few bilateral clauses against the discriminatory effects of exchange control certainly could not bring about this
fundamental change in the international monetary policy of the time in
question. To enforce such a change of policy was beyond the means of a
single country, even one with the economic strength of the United States.
For this, a concerted multilateral effort was indispensible.9 6
95. See the instruction of the U.S. Secretary of State to all diplomatic and consular
officials, June 6, 1935, [1935] 1 For. Rel. US. 536-49; cf. Hull, American Foreign Trade
Policies (U.S. Dep't State Commercial Policy Ser. No. 24, 1936).
96. The emphasis placed on the efforts of the United States to limit the discriminatory effects of exchange control should not create the impression that no other
country tried to do anything in the same direction. Some other states inserted similar
clauses in one or another of their trade agreements. But the struggle of the United States
against exchange control was the most systematic and thus, within the limits outlined
above, the most successful. As examples of similar efforts by other countries, see: Convention of Commerce and Navigation Between Norway and Uruguay, April 4, 1936, Final
Protocol, 176 L.N.T.S. 121 (1937); Preliminary Commerical Agreement Between the
Union of South Africa and Czechoslovakia, Jan. 27, 1937, art. III, 189 L.N.T.S. 97, 100;
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between Ecuador and the Netherlands, May 27,
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B. The Efforts on a MultilateralBasis To Protect International Trade
Against the DiscriminatoryEffects of Exchange Control
Were there any multilateral efforts in this direction before World War II?
There is great temptation to answer this question in the negative. An unreserved
"no" is in fact the correct answer insofar as multilateral efforts, even if they
have been undertaken, have not led to any sizeable success. There was no
multilateral treaty before World War II which imposed any obligation on
the parties to respect certain principles in case they introduced and practiced
exchange control, or in which specific forms and methods of exchange control
were declared altogether inadmissible. Not a single one of the numerous international economic and financial conferences of the period between 1920
and 1933 can be cited as having led, even by way of noncompulsory recommendations, to an actual success in the limitation of the discriminatory effects
97
of exchange control or in the elimination of this institution as a whole.
If one leaves aside the search for concrete results, one can find some more
or less timid attempts on a multilateral level even in this period. The League
of Nations should have represented an appropriate forum for this type of effort.
In fact the League developed, through its Economic and Financial Organization, a wide range of activities in the economic and monetary field which
were not limited to the formulation of common goals and advisory recommendations.0 8 But the period of the "successful" activities of the League
was the years prior to 1930, at which time exchange control became one of
the most dangerous obstacles to international trade relations.09 The constant
deterioration of the political climate after 1930 continually diminished the
possibilities of the League for productive work in this field. It soon became
apparent that, in the economic area also, political considerations played a
decisive role and that even close economic international cooperation was
possible only so long as a political willingness was present. The complete
failure of the London Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933 is a clear
example of this deterioration paralyzing every possibility for real progress.
By this time exchange control was already apparent as one of the main
dangers to international trade. The conference recognized this quite clearly,
but did not take any step whatsoever against the spreading of this device.100
1937, arts. V and VII, 194 L.N.T.S. 179, 181-82; Trade Agreement Between Canada and
Guatemala, Sept. 28, 1937, art. V, 194 L.N.T.S. 65, 68-69.
97. For a short but comprehensive account of all the worldwide and regional efforts
in this area, see Brown, The United States and the Restoration of World Trade 29-46

(1950).
98. For a discussion of the achievements of the League in this area, see Hill, The
Economic and Financial Organization of the League of Nations passim (1946).
99. One of the most spectacular results of these efforts on an international level was
the International Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and
Restrictions, signed in Geneva on Nov. 8, 1927, 46 Stat. 2461, 2499, 2517 (three parts),
[1929] RGBI 11. 649, 97 L.N.T.S. 391, T.S. No. 811. In this agreement exchange control and its effects on international trade are not even mentioned. The agreement never
came into force because the necessary number of ratifications was not reached.
100. See League of Nations Preparatory Comm'n of Experts, Draft Annotated Agenda
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After 1933, the League confined itself, at least as far as exchange control is
concerned, exclusively to the role of a warning observer. Its most valuable
contribution to a possible solution of the problem of exchange control was
the publication of a series of studies trying to demonstrate the reasons for
and effects of exchange control on the national and international level.10 ' However, the readiness of the members of the League to put these suggestions into
10 2
practice was rather small.
Also, even on a more limited, regional level, no success was achieved. The
efforts to protect the different currencies and to stabilize the interchange of
international economic relations, for example, inside the so-called Oslo Club, 0 3
among the members of the "Gold Bloc,"' 0 4 or the parties of Tripartite Stabilization Agreement, 0 5 or through the Inter-American struggle for more comprehensive cooperation, 0 6 led at most to declarations about the desirability and
necessity of a limitation or even elimination of exchange control 0 7 but no
corresponding action was ever taken.
of the Conference 20-21, 25 (L.N. Pub. No. 1933.IISpec.I.); League of Nations, Reports
Approved by the Conference on July 27, 1933, and Resolutions Adopted by the Bureau
and the Executive Committee 22 (L.N. Pub. No. 1933.II.Spec.IV.).
101. See League of Nations Joint Committee on the Enquiry Into Compensation and
Clearing Agreements, Enquiry Into Clearing Agreements (L.N. Pub. No. 1935.H.B.6.);
League of Nations Joint Sub-Committee of the Economic and Financial Committee, Report
on Exchange Control (L.N. Pub. No. 1938.lI.A.10.); League of Nations Economic, Financial and Transit Dep't, Quantitative Trade Controls (L.N. Pub. No. 1943IIA.5.); League
of Nations Economic, Financial and Transit Dep't, Trade Relations Between Free Market
and Controlled Economies (L.N. Pub. No. 1943.IIA.4.).
102. Thus the reaction to the suggestion of the League, made during the inquiry
into clearing agreements, to replace bilateral with multilateral clearing, was rather negative,
although it seems to have been the only possible way to normalize at least to some extent
international economic relations; cf. League of Nations Joint Committee on the Enquiry
Into Compensation and Clearing Agreements, Enquiry Into Clearing Agreements, supra
note 101, at 54-55, 145-49. Italy and Poland, at least, thought that the realization of the
League suggestion would be "neither useful nor even possible." Ibid.
103. See Convention de Rapprochment Economique entre l'Union Economique BelgoLuxembourgeose, le Danemark, la Norv~ge, Les Pays Bas et la Sulde, Dec. 22, 1930
(often cited as Oslo Convention), 126 L.N.T.S. 341, 25 Martens N.R.G. (3e sr.) 728.
104. See Protocol Concernant la Politique Montaire, Oct. 20, 1934 (signed by
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Switzerland), 6 Hudson,
International Legislation No. 396, at 945-46 (1960). The efforts of the "Gold Bloc" countries
in this regard are described in [19341 1 For. Rel. U.S. 594-614.
105. See Tripartite Stabilization Agreement With Great Britain and France, Sept. 25,
1936 (in November 1936 extended to Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland), WheelerBennett, [1936) Documents on International Affairs 668. See also [1936] 1 For. Rel. U.S.
535-65.
106. See the corresponding resolutions of the first meeting of the foreign ministers
of the American republics in Panama, Sept. 23-Oct. 3, 1939, U.S. Dep't State Pub. No.
1451, at 73-75 (U.S. Dep't State Conf. Ser. No. 44, 1940).
107. A protocol to the Oslo Convention, supra note 103, reads:
Us examineront d'autre part la possibilit6 d'tendre l'application du principe
qu est & Ia base de la Convention qu'ils ont signie a ]a date de ce jour aux
autres dispositions suceptibles d'affecter leurs 6hanges rciproques.
126 L.N.T.S. at 349, 25 Martens N.R.G. (3e s6r.) at 732.
The Tripartite Stabilization Agreement, supra note 105, reads in part:
The Government of the United Kingdom is moreover convinced, as are also the
Governments of France and the United States, that the success of the policy set
forth above is linked with the development of international trade. In particular it
attaches the greatest importance to action being taken without delay to relax pro-
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So, as a result of this short survey of the multilateral scene before World
War II, it can only be said that there was neither success nor even a real
attempt to do anything to prevent the spread of exchange control as a means
of regulation of foreign trade.
VII. CONCLUSION

The foregoing pages have shown that the traditional means of international law were not really appropriate to limit the discriminatory effects
of exchange control on international trade spreading over the world after
1933, and even less appropriate to "outlaw" exchange control as such. International law as shaped in the early 1930's offered a legal basis for protest
against the discriminatory effects of exchange restrictions on international
trade only in a few exceptional cases. That was the reason especially for the
United States as one of the major economic powers interested in world-wide
free competition to make an attempt to fill the apparently existing gap. These
attempts were successful at least insofar as they developed some basic ideas
about how to reach and to limit the most dangerous effects of exchange control
for international trade. On the other side, they also demonstrated the limited
value of these legal steps to protect multilateral nondiscrimination. The
reason for this limited effect has to be found in the character of the regulation against which they were taken. Tariffs are or at least can be an economically "neutral" means of regulation of foreign trade in the sense that they
are certainly not necessarily discriminatory as such. The reason for this
neutrality is that at least very often the purpose of the imposition of high
custom duties-for example, to open a new source of income or protect national industry as a whole or in part against foreign competition-can be
reached even if a network of most-favored-nation clauses granting nondiscriminatory treatment is carefully respected. This is different as far as exchange
control is concerned. Exchange control has at least in practice proved to lack
"neutrality." It can be neutral in the sense of allowing equal treatment to
all countries concerned only when there is free convertibility of all currencies
involved. But once free convertibility is established, exchange control is no
gressively the present system of quotas and exchange controls with a view to their
abolition.
Wheeler-Bennett, [1936] Documents on International Affairs 668.
The Interamerican Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, which took place in
Buenos Aires from December 1 to December 23, 1936, upon suggestion of the United States,
passed a resolution (No. XLIV) which reads:
The Interamerican Conference for the Maintenance of Peace recommends: . . .
That each Government declare its determination to bend every effort, having in
mind the different national economies, toward the objective of enforcing in all
the phases of its general commercial policy the peaceful and equitable principle of
equality of treatment, and recommends that the Governments of all countries adopt
this principle in their commercial policies, and in accordance therewith suppress as
soon as possible all discriminatory practices including those arising in connection
with import-license systems, exchange control, and bilateral clearing and compensation agreements.
U.S. Dep't State Pub. No. 1088, at 240 (U.S. Dep't State Conf. Ser. No. 33, 1937).
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longer a real and lasting danger to international trade, and all legal devices
against its discriminatory application become obsolete.
So the lesson the experience between the two wars has taught is a twofold one. The first is that there is not too much sense in fighting the discriminatory effects of exchange control on international trade on a purely
bilateral level. Even if these efforts succeed in avoiding discrimination in
bilateral relations for a certain period of time, they will sooner or later surrender to economic necessity, forcing even countries acting with perfect goodwill and the best of intentions into another direction. It is impossible for a
country with economic and financial difficulties and surrounded by more
countries with the same problems to live up to the promise of nondiscrimination even toward a limited number of its important trading partners, without
betraying the purpose for which exchange control was introduced in the
first place. The only way of approaching the problem with a certain chance
of success is the approach on a multilateral level. But even here chances are
more than slim if there is not very strong financial cooperation between the
countries involved, cooperation which goes much further than the "simple"
idea of nondiscrimination. The only real chance to reestablish the principle of
nondiscrimination as one of the most important conditions for multilateral
trade relations lies-and this is the second lesson of the inter-war experiencein a common, multilateral effort to bring about free convertibility again or
to design another multilateral system of payments, so that exchange control
can be abolished except, maybe, for some truly exceptional cases. This is
an economic, not a legal problem. Law and treaty clauses can only try to be
helpful in the step-by-step efforts to eliminate the economic conditions forcing
countries to introduce and to hold onto exchange control and to keep the idea
of equality in international trade relations alive meanwhile. Until these efforts
are successful, all attempts to introduce a legal prohibition on discrimination
in the form of a treaty clause which is too wide in scope and too strict in its
application necessarily lead to a disregard of the law, and thus achieve results
contrary to those intended.

